23 June 2025

Dissipation in a Modest Pot: Add-Back in MNV v CNV [2025] EWFC 176 (B)

When we think of asset dissipation and the “add-back” principle, we often picture yachts, casinos, or private jets. But in MNV v CNV [2025] EWFC 176 (B), Deputy District Judge Bradshaw dealt with these concepts in a far more relatable setting: a modest Midlands home, a VW van, and a husband who moved abroad to care for his elderly mother—taking a substantial slice of the matrimonial assets with him.

This case is a masterclass in how serious the consequences of financial decisions can be, even in low-asset cases. And it clarifies how the courts handle claims of dissipation and the potential for add-back when the matrimonial pot is small.

The Setup

The parties were long-term LGV drivers with a 14-year relationship and a teenage son. Their principal asset was the former matrimonial home, valued at around £181,000, with equity of £138,814. At separation, the husband held various assets—savings, a van, and a motorbike—amounting to approximately £50,000.

Post-separation, he transferred £17,000 to his brother abroad, later recovered it, sold the van for £27,000, and moved permanently to Country X to care for his mother, bringing the money (and some chattels) with him. The wife argued he had dissipated those funds and should not receive a further share of the remaining matrimonial assets.

The Add-Back Argument

The judge applied the established authorities on add-back, including Martin v Martin [1976], Norris v Norris [2003], Vaughan v Vaughan [2008], and MAP v MFP [2016]. From these, the following modern test was distilled:

  1. Was the expenditure reckless or wanton?
  2. Did it disadvantage the other spouse?
  3. Can the add-back be applied without frustrating the court’s ability to meet needs?

The judge found that the husband’s removal of £47,000 was:

  • Reckless: He took the only liquid assets while knowing there were none left for his wife or child.
  • Wanton: He prioritised his mother’s needs (post-separation) over those of his spouse and child.
  • Disadvantageous: His actions left the wife with no accessible funds.

Yet, the court did not add the £47,000 back into the schedule for distribution. Why? Because this was a “needs” case, and doing so would have left the husband with no ability to meet his own housing need. Still, the judge notionally treated the £47,000 as received for purposes of fairness—not to be repaid, but to calibrate how much more (if any) the husband should receive.

The Result

The husband received a modest lump sum of £6,500 to help rehouse himself in Country X—where property prices were far lower—and the wife retained the FMH. She was not ordered to pay ongoing maintenance, and a clean break was achieved.

Had the wife not raised dissipation and add-back arguments effectively, the result may have looked quite different.

Key Lessons for Practitioners

  • Dissipation can be found even in modest cases—it’s not just for HNW disputes.
  • “Add-back” is a powerful tool, but not always one that leads to pound-for-pound redistribution.
  • Judges may recognise dissipation but still decline a strict add-back if doing so would frustrate fairness or needs.
  • Evidence of reckless or wanton conduct must be clear—but moral culpability is not always enough (see MAP v MFP).
  • Consider proportionality of legal costs: here, the judge adjusted the husband's debt to reflect overspending on legal fees, citing YC v ZC [2022].

Final Thought

MNV v CNV demonstrates that even modest financial decisions can carry disproportionate consequences—and that the family court will examine behaviour with just as much scrutiny in a £150,000 case as in a £15 million one. For litigants and advisors alike, the message is this: the smaller the pot, the bigger the impact of each mistake.

20 June 2025

When “No” Means the Court Says It for You: DH v RH and the Power to Sign

In DH v RH [2025] EWFC 175, Mr Justice MacDonald delivered a powerful message to recalcitrant litigants in financial remedy cases: refusal to cooperate doesn’t stop the court—it just means the court steps in for you.

This case wasn’t about redrawing financial lines or recalculating assets. It was about enforcement—getting a final order actually implemented. And in this case, that required the court to sign property transfer documents on behalf of the non-compliant party.

The Background: A Final Order Ignored

The court had already made a comprehensive final financial remedy order in May 2024, awarding the wife around £6.2 million, structured carefully to provide both parties with housing and financial security. But one year later, the wife had refused to implement the order, particularly the transfers of real estate in the US, despite repeated attempts by the husband to resolve matters.

Her conduct was described as “deliberately obstructive”, and included:

  • Ignoring orders to engage in joint tax mitigation;
  • Filing a blizzard of unmeritorious applications, some without notice;
  • Refusing to sign key documents needed to transfer the properties; and
  • Even failing to attend the final enforcement hearing—offering no credible medical reason not to.

The Court's Response: Signing for Her

Relying on section 39 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court did what had to be done: it signed the property transfer documents itself, in her place.

This was not a surprise. The final order had anticipated this possibility and included a specific clause (paragraph 27(g)) allowing for judicial execution of documents in default of cooperation. As Mr Justice MacDonald put it, the court’s intervention was the only way to ensure the order had meaning:

“Without the court using its powers… the wife will continue to refuse to implement the order.”

This wasn’t punitive—it was practical justice, delivered with precision.

Not Just About Signatures: The Cost of Non-Compliance

The judgment also tackled the wife’s application to set aside the final order, citing claims of tax miscalculation, asset undervaluation, and fraud. But these were found to be recycled arguments from her dismissed appeal, unsupported by any credible new evidence.

In dismissing that application, the court emphasised:

  • The high threshold for set-aside: fraud, mistake, non-disclosure, or a Barder event.
  • The strong public policy in finality of litigation, especially where delay is self-inflicted.
  • Her repeated breaches of directions, especially on the tax issues she claimed to contest.

She was also ordered to pay indemnity costs, reflecting the court’s frustration with her litigation conduct.

Why This Case Matters for Family Lawyers

  1. Enforcement is real. If you build contingencies into your final order (as here), you can save months of delay when one party drags their feet.
  2. Section 39 is powerful. The court’s ability to execute documents has real teeth. It’s a crucial clause to include in orders involving property transfers.
  3. Adjournments require more than just a letter. The court showed a firm approach to late medical-based adjournment requests, especially where there's a history of obstruction.
  4. The limits of set-aside. You can’t relitigate a final order just because you don’t like the outcome—especially if the problems were caused by your own non-compliance.

Final Thought

DH v RH is a masterclass in how the court enforces finality, not just by dismissing baseless set-aside applications, but by stepping in to sign the dotted line when necessary. It’s a reminder that in family law, “final order” means just that—and if you refuse to cooperate, the court has a pen ready to take your place.

18 June 2025

Disclosure or Detention? A Stark Warning from Ozturk v Ozturk

In Ozturk v Ozturk [2025] EWFC 162 (B), Her Honour Judge Moreton handed down a judgment that should ring loud alarm bells for any party tempted to ignore court orders in divorce proceedings.

This was not a case about big money or complex asset structures—it was about a basic, foundational requirement of every financial remedy case: filing Form E. The husband didn’t file his Form E. He didn’t attend court. He didn’t engage. The result? A suspended prison sentence and a very public warning.

What Happened?

Mr Ozturk was ordered to file his Form E—with supporting documents—by 12 November 2024. That deadline came and went. The order had been personally served on him. He did nothing.

He ignored:

  • The initial directions to file Form E by 3 September 2024.
  • The First Directions Appointment (FDA) on 8 October 2024.
  • A further adjourned FDA in December 2024.
  • All attempts to resolve matters out of court.
  • The hearing on 8 May 2025 to determine whether he should be committed to prison for contempt.

Despite being properly served with the application and the hearing notice, he simply didn’t show up. The judge concluded that his non-engagement was deliberate and sustained.

The Sentence: 28 Days in Prison – Suspended

The court found Mr Ozturk in contempt of court for breaching a clear, personally served order that carried a penal notice. A custodial sentence of 28 days was imposed, but suspended on the condition that he finally complies and files a proper Form E within 28 days.

The judge made clear: this is his last chance.

Key Takeaways for Practitioners and Clients

  1. Form E Is Not Optional

Financial disclosure—via Form E—is the bedrock of fair outcomes in divorce. Without it, the court can’t evaluate needs, assets, or obligations. Non-compliance isn’t a strategy; it’s a contempt of court.

  1. Deliberate Non-Engagement Will Not Be Tolerated

The court described Mr Ozturk’s conduct as “wilful and repeated breaches.” This is what distinguishes late compliance from contempt. Judges will give latitude for mistakes or delay—but not for defiance.

  1. Committal Is Real

This case is a reminder that the penal notice isn’t an idle threat. Imprisonment for failure to comply with a financial remedy order is rare, but absolutely possible—especially where the party has received repeated opportunities to engage.

  1. Litigants in Person Are Not Exempt

Mr Ozturk was unrepresented, but that didn’t excuse his conduct. The court was satisfied that he understood his obligations and had simply chosen to ignore them. The court took steps to ensure he’d been served and had notice, which made his absence all the more serious.

  1. Costs Follow Non-Compliance

The court also awarded costs of £2,210.40 against Mr Ozturk, payable within 14 days. Delay and obstruction don’t just slow the process—they cost money, and the court will not hesitate to make non-compliant parties pay.

Final Thought

Ozturk v Ozturk isn’t about high finance—it’s about high stakes. If you don’t comply with disclosure obligations, you risk not just a worse financial outcome, but potentially your liberty. For lawyers, this case is a powerful tool to explain to reluctant clients why Form E isn’t a bureaucratic nuisance—it’s a legal obligation.

And now, thanks to this judgment, we can say with absolute clarity: ignore it at your peril.

16 June 2025

When Child Maintenance Crosses Borders : CA v UK

In CA v UK [2025] EWFC 117 (B), His Honour Judge Watkins delivered a sharp, thoughtful decision on an increasingly familiar scenario: how and where to resolve international child maintenance disputes when parents, assets, and court orders span multiple continents. At the heart of this case was an issue that’s rarely litigated but often debated: can a parent apply under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 to make an order against themselves?

Spoiler: no—but not for the obvious reasons.

The Background: From New York to Nottingham via California

The mother and father, both British nationals, divorced in New York. That court ordered the father to pay around £3,800 per month in child support. The mother and children later relocated to the UK, where the children became habitually resident. Meanwhile, the father moved to California.

This geographic triangle gave rise to a jurisdictional dilemma:

  • The mother initiated enforcement proceedings in New York, which eventually ceded jurisdiction.
  • The father then applied under Schedule 1 in England, not to resist maintenance, but (unusually) to formalise an English-based child support order—presumably to simplify the arrangements and reflect his current earnings.

The mother objected, arguing that:

  1. California was the more appropriate forum, especially as she had now registered the New York order there.
  2. The father's Schedule 1 application was procedurally flawed, since a parent cannot, under the plain wording of the statute, apply for an order against themselves.

Key Legal Issues and What the Court Decided

  1. Forum Conveniens

Following Spiliada Maritime v Cansulex, the judge asked: is there another more appropriate forum for resolving this dispute?

Yes—California.

  • The father’s income was generated there.
  • Child maintenance calculations in California are formulaic and tailored to local tax structures.
  • Proceedings were already underway there.
  • Any English order would still require registration and enforcement in California, with associated risk and delay.
  • Multiple proceedings across jurisdictions risked fragmented and inefficient litigation.

The court therefore stayed the father's Schedule 1 application.

  1. Can You Apply Against Yourself under Schedule 1?

The father’s application sought an order requiring himself to pay child maintenance—presumably into the UK court framework. This was procedurally innovative, perhaps even well-meaning, but ultimately misconceived.

Judge Watkins concluded that Schedule 1 does not permit a parent to apply for an order against themselves. The statutory language is clear: an order must be made to the applicant, or directly to the child. Legal gymnastics were suggested to get around this—such as the court making an order to the mother or the children—but the judge rejected these as inconsistent with the legislation.

This rare ruling may close the door on a growing workaround sometimes used in cross-border support cases.

Why This Matters for Practitioners

  • International enforcement is not just a technicality. Even cooperative parties may face difficulties when orders must be enforced abroad, particularly when defaulting parties live in the US or elsewhere.
  • Schedule 1 has limits. The statute wasn’t designed for mutual applications or administrative regularisation. Lawyers should resist the temptation to stretch its wording for convenience.
  • The child's habitual residence is important—but not always determinative. Even where children live in England, enforcement and variation of child support may best be resolved where the paying parent resides.
  • Think strategically about forum. Enforcement, taxation, and evidence all favour the payer’s jurisdiction in some cases, especially where courts apply fixed child support guidelines, as in California.

Final Thought

CA v UK offers more than a tidy lesson in forum conveniens—it’s a reminder that statutory frameworks must be respected, even in creative international family law scenarios. As cross-border parenting becomes increasingly common, clarity about what the English courts can—and cannot—do under Schedule 1 becomes all the more important.

For practitioners handling international cases, the takeaway is clear: pick your forum wisely, and don’t ask the court to order what it has no power to give—even if it sounds fair.

13 June 2025

Disclosure, Costs, and Fairness in OS v DT

In OS v DT [2025] EWFC 156 (B), His Honour Judge Edward Hess presided over a high-net-worth financial remedy dispute that, beneath its glittering spreadsheets and asset schedules, boiled down to something less glamorous—but no less vital: transparency, trust, and the true cost of confusion.

The case concerned a couple whose finances spanned multiple jurisdictions and asset classes. Yet what set it apart was not simply the scale (assets exceeding £9m), but the obstacle course the wife had to navigate in order to understand what was truly matrimonial property—a problem that stemmed from the husband’s management of his parents’ finances, and his initial resistance to fully explaining them.

The Disclosure Debacle

At the heart of the dispute was the husband’s assertion that various funds and investments were not his, but were held on behalf of his parents—particularly his father. This claim, he argued, exempted significant sums from the wife’s sharing claim.

But Judge Hess was unimpressed by how long it took the husband to present a coherent and well-evidenced account of these financial arrangements. In one striking paragraph, the judge wrote:

“The husband’s attitude could be characterised as being ‘just trust me, why are you troubling me with these unnecessary questions’ rather than attempting a proper explanation of a confusing situation with, potentially, significant amounts of money at stake.”

The eventual resolution of many of these issues only came after the failed private FDR, which significantly increased legal costs on both sides. Despite this, the judge declined to penalise either party in costs—finding that the wife had been justified in pursuing answers, and the husband had eventually provided clarity, albeit belatedly.

Costs: Not Just a Bottom Line

A particularly notable element of the case was the disparity in legal costs: the husband spent almost £490,000 on legal fees, while the wife spent £244,000. Both figures are eye-watering, but the difference between them sparked a debate: should the court adjust the asset division to reflect one party’s overspend?

The court ultimately said no—at least, not here. Despite citing established authority on adjusting for disproportionate costs (RH v RH, LS v SJ, YC v ZC), HHJ Hess found this wasn’t one of the “obvious” cases where penalising a party for excessive costs was justified.

This illustrates a key point for practitioners: the threshold for adjusting distribution due to costs is high, even when one party’s spending is arguably excessive. The court needs more than just a large figure—it needs clear evidence that those costs were wasteful or incurred unreasonably.

Practical Pointers

For family lawyers, the case offers several practical lessons:

  • Third-party wealth is a red flag: If a party claims to manage assets on behalf of relatives, press for clarity early—and get it in writing. Vague assertions of “it’s not mine” won’t fly.
  • Cost disparity alone won’t justify an adjustment: But a confusing or uncooperative approach to disclosure might.
  • Transparency pays dividends: The husband’s eventual transparency helped his case—but only after significant financial and procedural cost.

Final Thought

OS v DT reminds us that even in high-value cases, the bedrock of fairness is procedural clarity. In a world of RSUs, offset accounts, and startup investments, the simplest principle still applies: if you're holding someone else’s money, you'd better be able to prove it. And if you can’t—or don’t try—you may end up paying for the confusion, one way or another.

29 May 2025

Set Aside or Sit Tight? When Market Shifts Don’t Justify Reopening Financial Orders

In X v Y [2025] EWFC 144 (B), District Judge Stone delivered a forensic and educational judgment on a topic that regularly vexes family lawyers: can a final financial remedy order be reopened or varied simply because the property market dips?

Spoiler alert: the answer is no—at least not on the facts of this case.

Background: A House, a Fixed Sum, and a Change of Heart

The parties had agreed (and the court ordered) that the former matrimonial home in Cornwall would be sold, with the wife (Mrs Y) receiving £410,000 and the husband (Mr X) receiving the balance, after deducting various sale-related costs and a minor costs award.

At the time of the final hearing in December 2023, the property was valued at £800,000 based on a joint expert report. Both parties expected it might sell for more, but the court stuck with the expert figure. Notably, both had opted for fixed sums rather than percentage-based awards—Mr X specifically proposing to take the risk (or gain) if the property sold for less (or more).

When the market softened and the best offer received was £795,000, Mr X brought an application to set aside or vary the order, arguing that the change in property value was a material development rendering the order inequitable. He framed the claim under the Thwaite jurisdiction.

The Legal Framework: Barder and Thwaite

  • Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20 sets a high bar: to set aside a financial order due to a supervening event, the event must be unforeseen, exceptional, and undermine the basis of the order. It must occur shortly after the order and not prejudice third parties.
  • Thwaite v Thwaite [1982] Fam 1 is a narrower route, applicable only where the order remains executory (i.e. not fully implemented) and it would be inequitable to enforce it due to a significant change of circumstances. Crucially, if parties’ claims have already been dismissed, the court cannot substitute a new order, only refuse enforcement.

Here, Mr X had opted for Thwaite, recognising Barder was doomed to fail.

The Decision: Variation Refused, Order Upheld

DJ Stone dismissed the application. He found:

  • The property’s small reduction in value was not a sufficiently significant change. Mr X stood to lose a maximum of £13,000, and in some scenarios might even benefit due to elapsed mortgage penalties.
  • Mr X had proposed this very model of fixed-sum order—he took the upside risk, and must also accept the downside.
  • There was no suggestion of wrongdoing or delay by Mrs Y.
  • There was no expert evidence that the property’s value had truly dropped—just a single estate agent letter referencing a hesitant buyer.

Most importantly, the judge noted that even if he found the order inequitable, the court lacked jurisdiction to replace it because both parties’ financial claims had been dismissed outright in the original order. The application had nowhere to go.

Key Points for Family Lawyers

  1. Be careful with fixed-sum orders based on property values. If the market shifts, there's no guarantee the court will reopen the deal—particularly where a percentage-based award might have self-adjusted.
  2. Barder remains a high bar—it requires a genuinely unforeseen, devastating event.
  3. Thwaite is alive but limited: It applies only to executory orders and mainly allows courts to refuse enforcement—not rewrite orders—unless claims remain live.
  4. Dismissing claims outright? Double-check that the structure of your order doesn’t box your client out of relief if the sale goes awry.
  5. Market changes are not enough on their own—courts expect parties to accept ordinary risks.

Conclusion

This judgment is a useful clarification of the narrow—and narrowing—routes by which parties can revisit final orders. Mr X gambled on the market and lost slightly, but the court refused to let him reshuffle the deck. For family lawyers, the message is clear: structure settlement orders carefully, and don’t assume market movements will justify a second bite at the cherry.

23 May 2025

Unequal but Fair: When the Breadwinner Pays the Price in Divorce

In GR v AR [2025] EWFC 143 (B), His Honour Judge Edward Hess handed down a comprehensive judgment that serves as a reminder: the sharing principle may start at 50:50, but it doesn’t always end there—especially when one spouse brought significantly more wealth to the marriage.

This case is a textbook example of non-matrimonial property, the nuance of contributions, and the real-world difficulty of assigning mathematical fairness in long marriages where wealth is complex and pre-acquired.

Case Summary

  • Marriage length: Just over 9 years (including long cohabitation).
  • Parties: A high-earning wife with substantial pre-marital wealth, and a husband who stepped away from work to focus on parenting after a successful business career.
  • Total asset base: Over £41 million, largely held by the wife (£36m).
  • Outcome: Husband awarded a lump sum of £11 million, or 39% of the total liquid assets.

Key Issues and Judicial Reasoning

  1. Matrimonial vs Non-Matrimonial Property

The core of the dispute was how much of the wife’s wealth should be shared. She had accumulated significant wealth before marriage, mostly via shares in a major investment company. The judge rejected strict mathematical models offered by each side and instead followed Hart v Hart [2017] and Miller/McFarlane [2006], applying a broad evaluative approach. Ultimately, approximately two-thirds of her Swiss bank holdings and investments were deemed matrimonial acquest.

  1. The Family Home Counts—Even in Sole Names

The wife bought the home in her sole name, but Judge Hess followed well-established principles (Miller, Standish v Standish [2024]) that the family home—even if pre-owned—generally counts as matrimonial property. The husband was awarded 50% of the equity, adding over £1 million to his award.

  1. The "Sharp" Argument Rejected

The wife’s legal team leaned on Sharp v Sharp [2017] to argue that their separate finances during the marriage (splitting bills down the middle, etc.) should reduce any claim by the husband. But the judge declined to apply Sharp-style logic to a long marriage with a child, instead preferring the broader fairness lens of XW v XH [2020].

  1. Add-Backs and Alleged Spending

The husband sought “add-backs” for post-separation spending, including a watch and a gift from the wife to her mother. The court declined, emphasising that these were not so exceptional as to warrant financial penalty, and mirrored the husband’s own discretionary spending.

  1. Career Choices and Earning Capacity

The husband had declined work offers post-separation, citing a desire to focus on co-parenting. The wife suspected strategic unemployment. The court struck a balanced tone, noting his continued high earning capacity—but not penalising him for past choices. This aligns with the non-discriminatory approach of White v White [2000].

Practical Points for Practitioners

  • Tracing the marital element in complex investments requires realism: Judges are increasingly wary of "spreadsheet wars" that mask rather than reveal fairness.
  • Family homes remain special—even if owned in one name.
  • Pre-marital wealth still matters, but courts don’t always leave it untouched if it’s been mixed, grown, or relied on.
  • Keeping finances separate during marriage doesn't always carry the weight separating parties hope for—context is king.
  • Reasonable needs are not the only measure in HNW cases; sharing and fairness remain central.

Conclusion

GR v AR is a reminder that even in cases involving immense wealth, the court still wrestles with human judgment, not just arithmetic. The wife, whose fortune dwarfed the husband’s, retained the lion’s share—but not all of it. A clean break was achieved with a substantial lump sum that reflected the marriage's shared economic life, without punishing pre-marital success.

The result? Not 50/50, but fair—and that, ultimately, is the goal.

19 May 2025

The Sham That Wasn’t? When Debts and Divorce Collide in Family Law

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Awolowo v Awolowo and Linkserve [2025] EWCA Civ 641 is a masterclass in forensic scrutiny of alleged debts in financial remedy proceedings. It also serves as a reminder of the court’s critical role in sifting fact from fiction when third-party claims threaten to swallow the marital pot.

This case centres around whether a £1.6 million “loan” from the husband’s brother’s company was real—or a legal construct designed to keep assets out of the wife’s reach in her financial claim.

Background: A Debt Appears (Conveniently Late)

The case originated in financial relief proceedings under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, following an overseas divorce. The husband asserted that a family home in the UK—seemingly unencumbered—was in fact held on trust for his brother’s Nigerian company, due to a historic £1.6 million loan.

The wife, seeing the equity in the property evaporate, applied to set aside the loan and related judgments under section 23 MFPA 1984 (mirroring section 37 MCA 1973), arguing that the debt was a sham intended to defeat her claim.

At first instance, Her Honour Judge Vincent found the debt genuine, holding that the wife had not proved the loan was a fabrication.

What the Court of Appeal Found

The Court of Appeal disagreed—and firmly. Lord Justice Moylan delivered a damning analysis of the original decision. Key findings included:

  • The judge had misunderstood the effect of a Nigerian judgment, wrongly treating it as having determined the debt's legitimacy. In fact, it merely reflected an uncontested settlement agreement—not a finding of fact.
  • The court below had failed to account for the almost total lack of financial documentation, such as company accounts or bank transfers that might corroborate the debt.
  • Crucially, the judge discounted the wife’s evidence for lack of supporting documentation, even though such documents were in the control of the husband or his brother—a serious error in reasoning.

The matter was remitted to the High Court for full reconsideration.

Legal Themes of Note

  1. Sham Transactions and the Burden of Proof

The appellate court reiterated that proving a sham is a high bar, but also noted that if evidence creates enough suspicion, the evidential burden may shift. If a husband claims a company debt, he must come armed with documents to prove it.

  1. Foreign Judgments and Enforcement

This case also spotlights the limits of foreign judgment recognition, especially where there’s no adjudication of the underlying facts. Family courts must not be cowed by overseas decisions that amount to rubber-stamped settlements.

  1. The Balance of Interests

The Harman v Glencross and Kremen v Agrest lines of authority were crucial: where assets are insufficient to satisfy both a spouse and a creditor, the court must balance competing claims—not simply defer to a charging order.

Why This Case Matters

This decision underscores how creative debt claims can derail financial remedy cases—and the importance of judicial vigilance. When the origin of a debt is murky, and the creditor is a relative with no commercial incentive, alarm bells should ring. Especially when:

  • The loan terms are uncommercial (interest-free, undocumented);
  • The lender and debtor appear to act in concert;
  • Critical financial documentation is absent.

Key Points for Family Lawyers

  • Challenge debts robustly: If they surface late and lack documentation, seek full disclosure and test the evidence rigorously.
  • Don’t assume finality in registered foreign judgments—look at the process behind them.
  • Know your tools: Section 23 MFPA 1984 and section 37 MCA 1973 remain powerful weapons to prevent dispositions designed to defeat legitimate claims.
  • Press for joined hearings: As here, courts can and should consider financial remedy claims and third-party enforcement claims together, to ensure fairness.

Conclusion

Following the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the case has been remitted to the High Court for rehearing. This means that the wife will have another opportunity to argue that the alleged debt is a sham and that the property should remain available to meet her financial claim. The court will now hear full evidence—likely including cross-examination of the husband and his brother—and reach a fresh decision on the legitimacy of the loan and whether the previous judgments should be set aside. For family law practitioners, the upcoming hearing may provide further guidance on how English courts navigate offshore debt claims in matrimonial contexts.

But for now, the Court of Appeal has made it clear that family justice is not a playground for manufactured debts. If there’s an elephant in the room claiming to be a creditor, the court will—eventually—ask for proof that it isn’t just a man in a costume.

15 May 2025

Top-Up Child Maintenance in HNW Cases: Where Lifestyle Meets Logic

For family lawyers advising high-net-worth clients, the concept of “top-up” child maintenance is often one of the most contested elements in financial proceedings. The decision in James v Seymour [2023] EWHC 844 (Fam) adds further clarity (and complexity) to the landscape—reconciling parental affluence, fairness, and legislative boundaries.

But what exactly is a top-up order? And how far should the English courts go to ensure that a child’s lifestyle mirrors that of the richer parent?

What Is a “Top-Up” Order?

Under the Child Support Act 1991, the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) calculates maintenance obligations up to a gross annual income of £156,000. For earnings above this cap, the court regains jurisdiction under section 8(6), allowing it to make “top-up” orders. The rationale? In ultra-wealthy cases, CMS figures don’t touch the sides of the child’s actual needs or expectations.

James v Seymour: Conventional Awards vs Lifestyle Claims

In James v Seymour, the mother sought to increase maintenance to over £2,000 per month per child based on a “disparity of lifestyle” with the father, a successful private equity executive. But Mr Justice Mostyn wasn’t persuaded, stating:

“The amount that would be payable under the formula... is plainly excessive and not reasonably proportionate.”

Mostyn J preferred a conventional needs-based assessment, applying what he termed an “Adjusted Formula Methodology” (AFM) for high-income cases up to £650,000, acknowledging both its utility and its flaws.

CB v KB [2019]: Enter the Formula

This earlier case set the ball rolling. Mostyn J suggested that the CMS formula should provide a logical starting point—even for incomes up to £650,000. The so-called “Mostyn formula” offered predictability, but it was soon criticised for producing arbitrary per-child results and failing to reflect economies of scale in larger families.

Collardeau-Fuchs v Fuchs [2022]: Introducing HECSA

In Collardeau-Fuchs, the court made a crucial distinction between:

  • Conventional child support awards, calculated by reference to proportionate expenses.
  • Household Expenditure Child Support Awards (HECSAs), where the award reflects broader household running costs and lifestyle parity.

Top-up orders in HECSA cases go beyond food and clothing—they cover multiple properties, drivers, nannies, and international schooling. But such awards must still meet the fairness test under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

What Did James v Seymour Add?

Mostyn J’s most valuable contribution may be his proposed AFM framework, with adjustments based on:

  • School fees and other grossed-up costs;
  • Pension contributions;
  • Number of children and level of shared care.

This model aims to avoid disproportionate outcomes and offers guidance for incomes between £156,000 and £650,000.

He also acknowledged its limits:

  • It shouldn’t apply to variation applications;
  • It doesn’t work well for unearned income or capital-rich respondents;
  • It mustn’t override the discretionary test under s.25.

Practical Tips for Practitioners

  1. Budget First: A detailed child-focused budget remains the cornerstone of any claim. Don’t assume income alone drives quantum.
  2. HECSA or Not?: Be clear whether the claim is for a HECSA-style award (lifestyle parity) or a conventional needs-based sum.
  3. Use the AFM Sparingly: As a reference tool—not a rule.
  4. Don’t Overreach: Courts are alive to inflated claims. In James v Seymour, the court saw through attempts to use the father’s wealth as a blank cheque.
  5. Equalisation Isn't a Goal: Lifestyle parity may be a factor, but it's not the legal test. The court won’t iron out every disparity, particularly post-divorce.

Conclusion

In the HNW world, child maintenance can range from the modest to the majestic. But James v Seymour reminds us that fairness, not fortune, is the measure—and that clear, proportionate claims still carry the day. Practitioners should embrace the guidance while remembering that even in luxury, legal principles must still apply.

14 May 2025

Tying Up Loose Ends: THR v WAT and the Realities of High-Net-Worth Divorce

In THR v WAT [2025] EWHC 1125 (Fam), His Honour Judge Hess was faced with the unenviable task of transforming a multi-million-pound Xydhias agreement into a final financial remedy order—navigating disputed terms, hidden costs, forgotten interest, and inflated child maintenance schedules. The judgment offers practitioners a rare insight into the pitfalls of rushed settlements and the court’s insistence that “a deal is a deal”—even if you think you left something out.

The Context: A Quick Settlement in a Heavyweight Case

This was a “big money” case with substantial assets on both sides. The parties had six bundles of documents and a 10-day final hearing listed, but they reached an agreement on day one—what both sides called a binding Xydhias agreement. The problem? Not everything was spelled out clearly.

Over the next few days, the drafting revealed five points of contention:

  1. Whether a company loan should reduce the wife's lump sum.
  2. Whether estimated legal fees should be adjusted post-settlement.
  3. Whether the lump sums should attract interest.
  4. Whether the wife should receive additional security.
  5. What level of child periodical payments (CMS top-up) the husband should pay.

Xydhias Means Finality, Not Flexibility

The husband had agreed to pay the wife £36 million, less “what she already had”—a sum which his own documents put at £2.09 million. But he later argued this was a mistake, particularly because it didn’t reflect the (supposed) value of the wife’s interest in a company called X Ltd or her reduced legal fees.

The court disagreed.

Judge Hess reminded both parties that once they reached a Xydhias agreement, the court’s role was not to re-write the deal unless there had been fraud or clear mistake. The husband, having made a firm offer based on £2.09 million, was held to it. His Honour was clear:

“There was time to raise this if it was important... a deal is a deal.”

No Interest Means... No Interest

The wife’s team attempted to insert a clause for interest on the deferred lump sums—months after the deal was struck. Judge Hess ruled this was an afterthought, not part of the agreed terms. Despite being asked to add 3.75% interest on unpaid instalments, he refused:

“If the wife’s team wanted those to be an essential part of the deal, there was plenty of time... They did not.”

Security Provisions: Reasonable, Not Total

The husband offered partial security against the lump sums, which the wife wanted increased to 100%. The judge declined, noting the husband had already paid £5 million early and was not shown to be a flight risk or unwilling to comply. The court endorsed the principle that perfect security is not always necessary where trustworthiness is evident.

Top-Up Maintenance in the HNW World

Both parties agreed the case warranted a CMS top-up order under section 8(6) of the Child Support Act 1991. But the figures were miles apart:

  • Wife’s position: £50,000 per child, per annum (£150,000 total).
  • Husband’s position: £20,000 per child, per annum (£60,000 total).

Judge Hess landed in the middle at £25,000 per child—totalling £75,000 per year—and made some trenchant comments about the inflated and unrealistic budget put forward by the wife. Among the claims: £120,000 on holidays, £6,000 for children’s computers, and £2,000 on Christmas gifts.

We are dealing with children aged six, six, and three... the needs of children must be finite whatever the payer’s income.”

This aligns with the James v Seymour approach—where top-up maintenance is assessed from first principles (s.25 MCA 1973) rather than simply applying a cap or CMS formula.

Key Lessons for Practitioners

  • Don’t leave “loose ends” in a Xydhias deal—spell out issues like interest, security, and assumptions about asset values at the time of agreement.
  • Final means final—the court won’t revisit a deal just because one side gets buyer’s remorse.
  • Avoid “aspirational” budgets—top-up child maintenance claims must be grounded in actual need, even in ultra-wealthy families.
  • Security must be proportionate—perfect cover isn’t always required if the payer has a history of compliance.

Final Word

THR v WAT is a textbook example of the messiness that can follow an expensive, high-stakes settlement reached too quickly. For those dealing with big numbers and complex structures, it’s a reminder: if you want clarity, earn it at the drafting table—not by asking the court to fix what you forgot to ask for.

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