case law Archives - James Thornton Family Law

12 December 2025

When Litigation Conduct Crosses the Line: Lessons from RKV v JWC [2025] EWFC 430 (B)

If family law has a recurring theme, it is this: the financial remedy process works best when both parties engage honestly, promptly and proportionately. When one spouse turns the proceedings into a prolonged, combative campaign, the court’s patience wears thin — and the outcome can shift dramatically.

RKV v JWC [2025] EWFC 430 (B) is a stark illustration of litigation conduct at its very worst. Despite a net asset base of around £4 million, the husband’s behaviour throughout the litigation was, in the judge’s words, “absolutely appalling”. The judgment reads as a reminder — and a warning — that litigation conduct is not a mere sideshow. It can affect credibility, disclosure findings, and, in extreme cases, even the final division of wealth.

A Case That Should Have Been Simple — But Wasn’t

On paper, this was a straightforward case: a long marriage, a comfortable lifestyle, and an asset base that called for a broadly equal division.

But the husband’s conduct derailed everything.

The judgment records:

Persistent failures to disclose documents
Late evidence, often served only after repeated orders
Aggressive, obstructive correspondence
Missing deadlines without justification
Attempts to relitigate settled issues
Unfounded allegations, adding time and cost
A general refusal to cooperate unless forced by the court

This was not a one-off lapse in compliance — it was a pattern.

As the judge noted, the husband “treated the court process with contempt,” driving up the wife’s costs and obscuring the real financial picture.

What Litigation Conduct Actually Means

Litigation conduct is not simply “being difficult.”
It must be:

serious,
unreasonable, and
have financial consequences for the other party.

In financial remedy work, the court distinguishes between:

Bad behaviour during the marriage — not usually relevant

and

Bad behaviour within the litigation itself — can have costs and fairness consequences.

Where conduct impedes the court’s ability to determine the true financial position, it becomes relevant to both costs and the overall award.

That is exactly what happened in RKV v JWC.

The Outcome: Equality Survived — But Not Because the Husband Deserved It

Despite the husband’s conduct, the court still upheld an equal division of the £4 million asset base.

Why?

Because the wife did not argue that the husband should be penalised via a departure from equality. Instead, she sought — and received — a substantial costs order to reflect the damage his conduct had caused.

Had she pushed for a distribution adjustment, the judge signalled the door was open.
Indeed, the judgment makes clear that in an appropriate case, litigation conduct can justify a shift away from 50/50.

The reasoning is simple:
If one party forces the other to incur enormous avoidable expense, a costs order alone may not put them back in the position they should have been.

The Real Lesson: Costs Are Not the Court’s Only Tool

Courts are increasingly willing to:

Draw adverse inferences where disclosure is obstructed
Accept the evidence of one party where the other is unreliable
Penalise parties with costs orders running into the hundreds of thousands
Depart from equality where conduct has financial consequence
Condense hearings or bypass unnecessary litigation steps to prevent manipulation of process

In other words, litigation conduct now functions as a material factor in the fairness assessment, not a footnote.

RKV v JWC is part of a growing line of cases — including OG v AG, MRU v ECR, OO v QQ and Azarmi-Movafagh v Bassiri-Dezfouli — demonstrating that parties who abuse the process will not succeed.

Closing Thoughts

The message from RKV v JWC is clear: Litigation conduct isn’t just about manners — it’s about justice.

A spouse who obstructs disclosure, ignores court orders, or inflames proceedings may find that the supposed “tactics” cost them far more in the end. The Family Court will not allow one party’s misconduct to distort the process or drain the other’s resources unchecked.

In a jurisdiction built on fairness, transparency and cooperation, RKV v JWC is a strong reminder that how parties behave in litigation can be almost as important as what they own.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, litigation conduct, litigation misconduct, og v ag

4 December 2025

Fraud, Delay and Final Orders: Lessons from Silberschmidt v Richards [2025] EWHC 2841 (Fam)

Setting aside a final financial order is one of the most serious steps the Family Court can take. It disrupts finality, unravels what the parties thought was settled, and reopens litigation that may have been dormant for years. Because of this, the bar for reopening a case is high — but not insurmountable, particularly where there is fraudulent non-disclosure.

The recent decision in Silberschmidt v Richards addresses a question that regularly troubles practitioners: If a spouse discovers fraud years after the final order, but waits before issuing their application, can delay alone defeat an otherwise meritorious claim?

The answer from the High Court: Yes — in theory. But only where the delay makes a fair trial impossible. And on the facts of this case, the appeal against reopening the order was dismissed.

The Background: Fraudulent Non-Disclosure at the Heart

The wife applied to set aside a consent order years after it had been made, arguing that the husband had suppressed key financial information during the original proceedings. The judge at first instance accepted that her application had merit and that there was a real prospect that the husband had fraudulently failed to disclose significant assets.

The husband appealed, but not on the fraud issue. Instead, he argued:

The wife waited too long to bring the application once she suspected wrongdoing;
This delay meant the court should not have reopened the final order; and
The judge had not properly addressed whether the delay was, in itself, fatal.

This made the case a perfect vehicle for clarifying the law on delay in fraudulent non-disclosure set-aside claims.

Fraud Still Trumps Finality — But Only If a Fair Trial Is Possible

Mr Justice Poole, dismissing the appeal, reaffirmed the classic starting point:

Fraud “unravels all” — but not at any cost.
Delay may defeat a set-aside application, but only where it renders the litigation unfair or the evidence impossible to evaluate.

The High Court emphasised three guiding principles:

The Court Must Balance Finality Against Justice

Finality is important, but it cannot be used as a shield for a spouse who deliberately misled the court.

Delay Is Not Determinative Unless It Causes Irredeemable Prejudice

The key question is prejudice, not simply the passage of time.

The court looks at:

Has evidence been lost?
Are witnesses no longer available?
Has the factual landscape changed so much that truth can no longer be established?
Would the fraudster suffer unfairness if the matter is reopened?

A Meritorious Claim Should Not Be Shut Out Without Good Reason

Even if delay is long, the court will not bar a claim where:

the fraud can still be fairly investigated;
the spouse did not reasonably discover the fraud earlier;
the alleged wrongdoer caused or contributed to the delay;
the integrity of the original order is fundamentally compromised.

In Silberschmidt v Richards, despite the gap in time, none of the husband’s alleged prejudice was enough to prevent a fair hearing. The wife’s application was therefore properly allowed to proceed.

Why the Appeal Failed

The High Court held that the judge at first instance had:

applied the correct legal test,
acknowledged the delay,
weighed it appropriately within the overall justice of the case, and
concluded (rightly) that a fair investigation was still possible.

In other words, the husband could not convert his own alleged fraudulent non-disclosure into a procedural shield.

Why This Case Matters

This appeal provides valuable clarity for lawyers and clients alike:

Delay can be fatal — but it usually won’t be.

Only where delay makes a fair trial impossible will the court refuse to reopen a consent order tainted by fraud.

Fraud remains the highest-ranking threat to finality.

The overriding objective remains doing justice, not preserving an order built on deceit.

Applicants must act promptly once they have evidence.

A meritorious application will not automatically succeed if a party sleeps on their rights.

Respondents cannot rely on delay they contributed to.

A spouse who has hidden assets cannot complain when the truth eventually emerges.

Closing Thoughts

Silberschmidt v Richards reinforces a simple but crucial principle:
Final orders matter — but honesty matters more.

Where fraud is alleged, the court will look carefully at whether the truth can still be uncovered. If it can, delay will rarely be decisive. For anyone facing the discovery of non-disclosure years after the ink has dried on a consent order, this decision offers clarity — and a fair chance to put things right.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, fraud, non disclosure, set aside

1 December 2025

Risk, Liquidity and Fairness: Key Lessons from BY v GC (No. 2) [2025] EWFC 397

How should the Family Court divide extremely high-value assets where one spouse’s wealth is tied up in high-risk, illiquid ventures, and the other needs long-term financial stability?
In BY v GC (No. 2) [2025] EWFC 397, Nicholas Allen KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, tackled exactly this problem — ultimately valuing the asset base at £89.5 million and departing from equality to award the husband 55%.

The reasons why make this a compelling judgment, and an important one for family law practitioners.

A Case Built on Risky Wealth and Unreliable Disclosure

The husband’s financial world consisted of:

high-risk investments,
significant debt exposure,
uncertain company valuations, and
assets whose value fluctuated dramatically.

Much of his claimed wealth was bound up in ventures described as speculative or volatile, with no guaranteed return and no easy route to liquidity.

The wife’s financial circumstances could not have been more different. She needed:

stable capital,
reliable income,
and long-term security for herself and the children.

The mismatch between risk appetite (his) and financial vulnerability (hers) shaped the outcome.

Finding the Real Number: £89.5 Million

A central feature of the judgment is the computation of the husband’s wealth, which Nicholas Allen KC found was not presented transparently.

The court identified:

gaps in disclosure,
inconsistencies, and
a financial narrative that was not fully credible.

Where evidence was unreliable or missing, the judge drew adverse inferences and adopted the valuations that best reflected the documentary record and expert analysis.

The final finding — £89.5 million net assets — was higher than the husband contended, and it formed the basis for the sharing exercise.

Why 55/45 Was Fair: The Modern Risk-Weighted Approach

The starting point in a long marriage would ordinarily be a 50/50 split.
But this was not a straightforward “pots of cash” case.

Nicholas Allen KC accepted that:

The husband had accumulated his wealth by taking significant financial risks.
Those risks still attached to many of the assets he would retain.
The wife should not be forced into an unstable investment landscape she had never participated in.

The judge therefore applied a risk-weighted distribution:

Husband – 55% (but almost entirely in high-risk, illiquid assets)

Wife – 45% (in more secure, accessible funds)

This approach reflects an increasingly recognised principle:
a numerical percentage is only meaningful if you also examine the risk profile of the assets each spouse receives.

A strict 50/50 split would have been numerically equal but functionally unfair, because it would expose the wife to volatility she could not withstand.

The Wife’s Needs Remained Central

Even at nearly £90 million, this was not a pure sharing case.
Nicholas Allen KC still anchored the award in the wife’s reasonable needs:

secure housing,
reliable income,
financial stability for the children,
and protection from the husband’s investment volatility.

The judgment confirms that needs remain a vital cross-check, even in “big money” cases.

The wife required certainty, not a seat on a financial rollercoaster.

Credibility Still Matters — Even at £89 Million

A major influence on the computation exercise was the court’s view of the husband’s credibility.
Where figures lacked clarity or explanation, the judge preferred:

expert valuation,
contemporaneous documents, and
logical inference.

The message is clear: even in the wealthiest cases, the court’s patience for incomplete disclosure is short.

Why BY v GC (No. 2) Matters

This judgment is important because it illustrates:

Modern risk-adjusted sharing

Courts will depart from equality to prevent the financially weaker spouse inheriting speculative or unstable assets.

Disclosure remains paramount

Where a party’s financial picture is unreliable, the court is willing to reconstruct it.

Needs still matter — even in “big money” cases

Stability for the economically weaker spouse is a core objective.

Asset composition matters as much as the headline figure

£10 million in a risky venture is not the same as £10 million in cash or secure investments.

Ultimately, BY v GC (No. 2) shows the Family Court at its most pragmatic: willing to depart from equality, willing to draw firm inferences where disclosure falls short, and willing to prioritise stability over abstract arithmetic. In an era where wealth is increasingly tied to complex and risky investment structures, the case is a reminder that fairness is not just about the size of the pot, but about the real-world security each party walks away with.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: business valuations, case law, illiquidity, liquidity, risk laden, valuation

28 November 2025

When “Set in Stone” Isn’t: Varying Maintenance and Escaping Old Undertakings in ABC v XYZ [2025] EWFC 370 (B)

Many clients think that once a financial order is made on divorce, that’s it forever. ABC v XYZ is a reminder that things are more flexible than that – but also that fighting over variation can be ruinously expensive.

District Judge Maddison in Birkenhead was asked to decide two linked questions:

Should a former husband be released from undertakings given in a 2020 consent order?
If so, how should the spousal maintenance now be set?

The case is a good opportunity to look at Birch v Birch, variation of periodical payments, “over-provision” through index-linking, and the sheer cost of taking a relatively narrow dispute all the way to a final hearing.

The original deal: tax planning dressed as maintenance

ABC (husband, now 61) and XYZ (wife, 59) had a long marriage of about 24 years, separating in 2016 and resolving finances by consent in 2020.

Key parts of that order:

The wife kept the former matrimonial home (a five-bed, three-reception property).
She also kept shares in the family company, F Limited, and received £50,000 per year in discretionary dividends, index-linked to RPI.
The husband undertook to use his “best endeavours” to make sure F Limited paid those dividends.
If the company didn’t, he undertook to “top up” via a nominal periodical payments order – effectively guaranteeing her income.
There were share transfers the other way and a pension share in her favour.

Everyone understood this as a continuation of a tax-efficient marital income structure: using her lower tax rate and allowances while he sacrificed salary.

Fast forward to 2025, and the picture looked different.

Back to court: when the company falters

By 2025, F Limited had had a very bad year – a seven-figure loss, redundancies, and a halt to bonuses and dividends. The husband argued that:

The dividends paid to his ex-wife were, in reality, simply being carved out of his own package.
With the business under pressure and his own debts rising (including a director’s loan and borrowing from his father), he couldn’t afford to keep propping up the arrangement.
He asked to be released from all undertakings and for the nominal maintenance to be replaced with £1,000 per month, non-indexed, on a joint lives basis.

The wife’s position was simple: the 2020 order should stand. She said:

The dividend structure was what he proposed at the time;
Her needs hadn’t gone away; and
The company’s poor year looked more like a blip than a permanent collapse.

However, she did accept one important point: if maintenance switched from taxable dividends to tax-free spousal maintenance, her income need would reduce by about £753 per month (which is what she currently paid in income tax on the dividends).

The legal framework: Birch, undertakings and variation of maintenance

The court can’t “vary” an undertaking in the way it can vary a periodical payments order – but it can:

Release a party from an undertaking; and
Impose different undertakings or a revised maintenance order in its place.

The Supreme Court in Birch v Birch confirmed that the court should approach release from undertakings via s.31(7) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, i.e.:

Has there been a significant change in circumstances?
Looking again at the s.25 factors, what is now fair?

District Judge Maddison also applied the modern guidance on varying income orders, including:

The focus is on needs, not relitigating capital.
The court can look at amortising capital, but it’s not automatic.
The burden is on the payee (here, the wife) to justify ongoing dependence and the level of provision.

What did the judge actually do?

First, the judge was not persuaded that F Limited had irreversibly collapsed. The 2024 accounts showed respectable performance; 2025 looked more like a bad year than a permanent new normal.

Second, the judge accepted:

The wife’s income needs were around £3,500 per month after some trimming of her budget (including council tax discount and modest economies).
She receives no earnings, has real health and age-related vulnerability and no realistic earning capacity.
She should not be required to start eating into her modest capital or pension to subsidise current living costs.

Third, the judge held that the wife was currently over-provided for:

The original £50,000, now RPI-linked to over £67,000 per year, plus tax effects, meant she was receiving more than she needs on her own case.
This justified a downward variation.

The final order:

The husband is released from all undertakings in the 2020 order.
The nominal periodical payments order is varied to £2,900 per month,
Index-linked going forward (but to CPI, not RPI),
On a joint lives basis.

In other words: the tax-driven dividend machinery is dismantled, but the wife keeps a secure, needs-based income stream for life.

The sting in the tail: £175,000 in costs

Perhaps the most striking passage in the judgment is the judge’s comment on costs:

Between them, the parties had spent £175,287.10 over less than 10 months.
That equates to about five years’ worth of maintenance at the newly ordered level.

This was, in the judge’s words, a “relatively simple dispute” about the level of maintenance and the form it should take. It was “eminently capable of settlement”, but both sides adopted rigid and unrealistic open positions, which blocked compromise.

Practical lessons

For practitioners and clients, ABC v XYZ underlines:

Undertakings are not untouchable – they can be revisited where circumstances significantly change.
Index-linking (especially to RPI) can drift into over-provision and may justify variation.
Tax-driven structures may work well in the marriage, but can become distorted or unfair post-divorce.
Courts are slow to force a non-earning, vulnerable spouse to live off capital where maintenance was plainly intended.
And above all: the cost of litigating modest variations can very quickly outstrip the value of what’s in dispute.

For many separating couples, the smarter option is often to renegotiate sensibly with early legal advice, rather than spending years’ worth of maintenance arguing over the decimal points.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: birch v birch, case law, spousal maintenance, undertaking, variation

19 November 2025

Liquidity, Needs and Transparency: Key Lessons from NI v AD [2025] EWHC 2997 (Fam)

High-value divorce cases often turn on complex business valuations, competing expert evidence and sharply differing narratives. But in NI v AD [2025] EWHC 2997 (Fam), Mr Justice Trowell had to wrestle with something more fundamental: a family whose financial prospects were shaped not just by wealth, but by illiquidity, delay, mistrust and the long shadow of coercive control.

With net assets of around £6.5 million — but only £2.7 million in liquid funds — this case offers a clear illustration of how the court balances needs, liquidity, and transparency when the bulk of the wealth is tied up in an unlisted family business.

A Marriage of Eight Years, a Six-Year Separation, and a High-Value Dispute

The parties, now aged 37 and 47, separated in 2019 after an eight-year marriage. They share three children, now 11, 9 and 8. The wife, who had followed the husband to the UK from abroad, was the primary carer and had recently completed a psychology degree. Her earning capacity — and how realistically she could build a teaching career while caring for three children — became a live issue.

The husband, meanwhile, was one of three brothers behind a highly successful family business linked to “Product A”. His income came entirely through dividends, and the business structure involved a web of subsidiary companies, side ventures and inter-company loans.

This was not a simple asset schedule.

A Central Problem: Wealth That Exists on Paper, But Not in Cash

Although the overall asset pool was close to £6.5 million, the vast majority was locked inside the family company, Company A, where the husband held a one-third share.

Two features complicated matters:

Illiquidity — A significant proportion of the husband’s wealth was in business shares that could not be realised without a sale agreed by all three brothers.
A vast director’s loan account (DLA) — Standing at £5.6 million, funded by living costs, renovations, legal fees and business reinvestment. The court repeatedly pressed the husband on how he intended to repay it. His answers lacked clarity, and the judge concluded he was “not being open” on this issue.

These two features heavily shaped the eventual outcome.

The Non-Disclosure Issue: A Hidden Company Sale

Midway through the proceedings, the wife’s legal team discovered that a subsidiary company — Company C — had been sold for £6 million on 1 October 2025.

The husband had:

Failed to mention the sale in his section 25 statement (filed the day before the sale);
Failed to mention it in a later statement filed after the sale;
Failed to tell the court or the jointly instructed accountant.

The judge was blunt: the husband had concealed the sale because he believed it would harm his case.

This finding significantly impacted credibility and valuation.

Valuation Battles — and the Court’s Practical Approach

The two forensic accountants disagreed sharply on:

Multipliers for valuing the main operating company
The value of various subsidiaries
The treatment of the director’s loan
Whether the husband’s income was £168,000 or £1.1 million per year

Justice Trowell adopted a pragmatic middle-ground. He:

Placed £6 million on the sold company
Applied an EBITDA multiplier of 8 for the core trading company
Discounted certain loss-making subsidiaries
Rejected a full 30% minority discount, describing it as an illiquidity indicator rather than a real-world reflection of what the husband would receive

This resulted in liquid assets of £2.7m and illiquid business interests of £3.8m.

Needs Drive the Outcome

Despite the wife arguing sharing, the judge concluded this was a needs case. Key reasons:

It was a short marriage
Most of the wealth arose post-separation
Liquidity constraints made equal sharing artificial

The wife needed £2.2 million to buy a home near the children’s schools, plus her outstanding legal fees. She was therefore awarded:

£2.23 million in capital (including a lump sum from the husband)
Spousal maintenance of £73,300 per year for three years, then £57,800 per year until June 2036
Child maintenance at £10,000 per child per year
School fees

The husband kept the illiquid business assets — and the DLA problem.

Why This Case Matters

NI v AD is a cautionary tale that highlights:

Liquidity matters as much as headline wealth

£3.8 million in shares is of little use in paying rent or school fees.

Transparency is non-negotiable

Failing to disclose the sale of Company C materially damaged the husband’s credibility.

Needs remain the touchstone

Even in high-net-worth cases, the court will prioritise housing and income needs for the primary carer and children.

Courts will scrutinise business structures — firmly

Opaque company arrangements and unclear director’s loan arrangements invite judicial scepticism.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: business assets, business valuations, case law, illiquidity, liquidity

11 November 2025

When Time Is Short: Terminal Illness and the Court’s Discretion in Financial Remedy Cases

In OO v QQ [2025] EWFC 310 (B), His Honour Judge Hyde faced one of the most delicate balancing acts in family law: how to achieve fairness when one party is terminally ill. The case is a poignant reminder that behind every financial remedy judgment lies a human story — and that the court’s wide discretion under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 allows justice to be shaped by compassion as well as calculation.

The Background

The parties were married for almost 20 years. Both were in their mid-50s, with total assets just under £1 million. Tragically, the wife had been diagnosed with terminal cancer. Her prognosis was poor, and medical evidence suggested she had limited time remaining.

The husband argued that the court should recognise this by limiting her award, since her financial “needs” would be short-lived. The wife, however, sought security and dignity — not only for her remaining life but also to ensure her affairs were settled with stability and her adult children were not left with uncertainty.

The Court’s Approach

Under section 25, the court must consider all the circumstances of the case, including each party’s needs, resources, age, and health. Health is often relevant in assessing earning capacity or ongoing expenditure — but where a party faces terminal illness, it becomes central.

HHJ Hyde accepted that the wife’s needs were immediate and pressing. She required a secure home, funds for care, and the ability to live her remaining time free from financial anxiety. The judge also noted that the husband, in good health and with ongoing earning capacity, was better placed to recover financially.

Accordingly, the court divided the assets 56% to the wife and 44% to the husband — a departure from equality justified by her exceptional health circumstances and the need to ensure her welfare and peace of mind.

Balancing Fairness and Humanity

This judgment demonstrates that “needs” are not purely mathematical. They must be understood in context. A party with a limited life expectancy has needs that are immediate, intensive, and deserving of priority.

HHJ Hyde’s decision reflects the broader principle that fairness in family law is not confined to equal division. It also encompasses empathy and recognition of personal circumstances. As the court observed, the aim is not to achieve actuarial precision but a just and humane outcome.

Why OO v QQ Matters

OO v QQ reinforces several key principles:

The court’s discretion under section 25 is wide enough to reflect human realities.
Health and life expectancy can justify a significant departure from equality.
“Needs” in family law extend beyond duration — they include intensity, security, and dignity.

Ultimately, this case captures the compassionate side of family justice. It shows that even in cases governed by figures and percentages, the court’s true task remains to do what is fair — especially when time is short.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, needs, terminal illness

6 November 2025

Can You Redact Payee Details from Bank Statements in Family Proceedings?

One of the most common disclosure disputes in financial remedy cases concerns redactions — particularly when a party removes payee details from their bank statements before producing them to the other side. Some claim these details are “irrelevant” or “private.” But is it actually permissible to do that?

The Duty of Full and Frank Disclosure

The starting point is simple and absolute: each party in financial remedy proceedings owes a duty of full and frank disclosure. Practice Direction 9A to the Family Procedure Rules (FPR) makes clear that parties must provide a complete and honest picture of their finances so that the court can achieve a fair outcome.

That duty extends to every material document, including 12 months of bank statements for all accounts disclosed in Form E. The Form E statement of truth is not just a formality — it’s a personal confirmation that the disclosure is “full, frank, clear and accurate.” Any attempt to conceal or withhold information undermines that duty.

The Rules on Redaction

Redacting payee details amounts to withholding part of a document. The FPR don’t allow a party to decide unilaterally which parts of their disclosure the other side can see. If a party genuinely believes they have a right or duty to withhold part of a document — for example, to protect legally privileged information or a third party’s confidentiality — there is a formal process to follow.

Under FPR 21.3(3):

“A party who wishes to claim a right or duty to withhold inspection of a document, or part of a document, must state in writing (a) the right or duty claimed, and (b) the grounds on which that right or duty is claimed.”

That written statement must be sent to the other side, who can then challenge the redaction under FPR 21.3(5). If the matter is disputed, the court may inspect the document itself and decide whether the information can properly be withheld.

In short: there is a mechanism for limited redaction, but it must be done transparently and — if necessary — with the court’s approval. Simply blacking out names or transactions because they are “personal” or “irrelevant” is not permitted.

Why Payee Details Matter

Payee information often provides vital context: who a party is paying, whether assets have been transferred, or whether money has been dissipated. Even regular spending patterns can help the court assess lifestyle and credibility. What one party views as “irrelevant” may in fact be highly significant to the other or to the court’s assessment of needs and fairness.

Consequences of Improper Redaction

Unjustified redactions can amount to non-disclosure. The court may draw adverse inferences, order further disclosure, or even make a costs order against the party responsible. In serious cases, non-disclosure discovered after judgment can justify an application to set aside the final order.

As the Court of Appeal emphasised in Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908, disclosure in family cases must be handled through proper procedures — not through unilateral decisions about what should or should not be revealed.

The Bottom Line

Unless a party follows the proper process under FPR Part 21, it is not procedurally permissible to redact payee details from bank statements before disclosure. The default position is clear: full, frank, and open disclosure is the rule — not the exception.

Where genuine confidentiality concerns exist, the right approach is to raise them transparently and, if needed, invite the court to decide. Anything less risks serious procedural and evidential consequences.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, fpr part 21, practice and procedure, redact, redaction

22 October 2025

When Divorce Crosses Borders: Financial Relief After a Foreign Divorce in TY v XA [2025] EWFC 349

When marriages span multiple countries, untangling financial obligations can become a jurisdictional labyrinth. The recent High Court judgment of TY v XA (No. 2) [2025] EWFC 349 by Mr Justice Cusworth is a compelling example of how England’s Part III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 powers operate when one spouse seeks financial relief after an overseas divorce — here, in Germany.

The case stands as a reminder that Part III applications are not a second bite of the cherry, but a safety net against injustice where a foreign financial settlement leaves one party inadequately provided for.

The International Background

TY and XA — an Austrian husband and French wife — married in Austria, lived across Europe, and divorced in Germany in 2019. The German court approved a notarised Separation Deed, under which the wife received maintenance for a fixed term and payment of rent, but no capital settlement. The husband, meanwhile, retained substantial wealth.

After relocating to London with the children (with permission from the German court), the wife applied in England for Part III relief, arguing that the German settlement was unfair and left her in financial hardship. Her application was supported by significant evidence of mental and physical health difficulties, limiting her earning capacity.

The Legal Challenge: What Can England Do After a Foreign Divorce?

The central legal question was whether the English court could revisit — or vary — the German Deed. Under Part III of the 1984 Act, the court can make financial orders after a foreign divorce if there is a sufficient English connection and if it is appropriate to do so, having regard to all the circumstances (Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] 1 AC 628).

However, the Maintenance Regulation (EU 4/2009) still applied to this case, meaning English courts could not review the substance of the German order (Art. 42), but could vary it if circumstances had changed (Art. 21).

Mr Justice Cusworth held that the German Deed was valid and binding under German law, but that subsequent changes in circumstance—notably the wife’s health deterioration, relocation, and ongoing needs—justified modification of the maintenance terms, not a wholesale re-opening of the settlement.

A Question of Fairness and Forum

The court drew heavily on Agbaje principles, emphasising that Part III is not a tool for forum shopping. A mere disparity between a foreign award and what would have been achieved in England is not enough. Yet where unmet needs remain, and where England has become the parties’ clear home, the court may intervene to ensure fairness.

In TY v XA, both parties and their children were now habitually resident in London, and the German court no longer had jurisdiction. Against this backdrop, Mr Justice Cusworth ordered enhanced maintenance provision for the wife and children — recognising real change in their financial and medical circumstances since 2019.

Why This Case Matters

This judgment underlines several key points for practitioners and internationally mobile families:

Part III relief is exceptional, not routine. It is a remedy for unfairness, not an opportunity to re-litigate a foreign divorce.
Foreign settlements remain binding — but not untouchable. English courts can modify maintenance where there has been a genuine change of circumstances.
Timing and motive matter. Delays in applying and perceived forum-shopping will weigh against applicants.
Evidence is everything. The wife’s success rested on clear, medical evidence demonstrating her deteriorating health and inability to earn.

Cross-Border Fairness in the Modern Family Court

TY v XA shows the delicate balance English courts strike between respecting foreign judgments and ensuring fairness for families who have since made their lives here. The decision reinforces that Part III jurisdiction is not about English generosity — it’s about English justice.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: agbaje, case law, foreign divorce, part III MFPA 1984, Part III relief

8 October 2025

HA v EN: Another Chapter in the Xydhias Story

Financial remedy cases often settle through negotiation long before a consent order is sealed. But what happens when the parties reach “agreement in principle” yet still argue over the details? The Xydhias line of cases provides the answer—and the recent High Court decision in HA v EN [2025] EWHC 2436 (Fam) adds an important new layer.

The Background

In HA v EN, the husband and wife had reached terms that were accepted to amount to a Xydhias agreement. But all was not plain sailing. The wife’s legal costs and the mechanics of selling the family home (FMH) remained hotly contested. The FMH sale price also looked uncertain, raising the risk of a shortfall.

The court therefore had to decide:

What exactly had the parties agreed?
Could the court “fill in the gaps” on unresolved implementation issues?
Was there scope to revisit the agreement if the FMH realised less than expected?

The Xydhias Principle

The leading case of Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] established that once parties have reached a clear agreement in financial remedy proceedings, neither can simply walk away before a consent order is drawn. However, unlike in pure contract law, the agreement is not automatically enforceable: the court must still approve it as fair under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

Subsequent cases (Rose v Rose, Kicinski v Pardi) have distinguished between:

Xydhias agreements – binding in principle, but still subject to fairness and judicial approval.
Rose orders – agreements actually approved by a judge at FDR or in court, which carry even greater weight.

What’s New in HA v EN?

Deputy High Court Judge Richard Todd KC confirmed the core Xydhias approach: where the broad terms are agreed, the court can resolve peripheral disputes (like costs or sale mechanics) without unravelling the deal.

But he went further. He noted that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, sections 34–35, provides a statutory mechanism to vary or rescind “maintenance agreements” in certain circumstances. While rarely used, Deputy High Court Judge Richard Todd KC suggested these provisions could, in principle, allow the court to revisit a Xydhias agreement if fairness so required—for example, if the FMH sold for far less than assumed when the deal was struck.

This opens the door to a nuanced safety valve: most Xydhias agreements will hold firm, but if events make the outcome manifestly unjust, limited variation may be possible.

Why It Matters

Flexibility with certainty: HA v EN confirms that courts will give effect to Xydhias agreements, ironing out drafting and implementation issues rather than letting parties resile.
The fairness filter: As ever, the court must still test the outcome against section 25 MCA 1973.
Variation is possible: The judgment points to a rarely-discussed route (ss.34–35 MCA) to vary agreements if circumstances change dramatically.
Contractual debate continues: Deputy High Court Judge Richard Todd KC also revisited Soulsbury v Soulsbury, which recognised a contract outside the MCA context, highlighting the blurred line between contractual enforceability and family law discretion.

Final Thought

HA v EN shows the Xydhias doctrine is still evolving. For practitioners, the message is twofold: record agreements clearly, but be aware that the court retains both the power and duty to ensure fairness—and, in rare cases, to adjust agreements if unforeseen events threaten to make them unjust.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, consent order, richard todd kc, rose v rose, soulsbury v soulsbury, xydhias

29 September 2025

Enforcing and Varying Financial Orders: What Collardeau v Fuchs Teaches Us

In family law, the term “final order” is sometimes misleading. The recent decision in Collardeau v Fuchs [2025] EWFC 307 shows how even a carefully crafted final financial remedy order can be revisited when enforcement problems and major breaches arise.

Background

This case is the latest in the long-running litigation between Alvina Collardeau and Michael Fuchs. Following the breakdown of their marriage, Mostyn J made a Final Order in June 2023, based heavily on the couple’s prenuptial agreement. W was granted continued occupation of the West London family home (“WLH”) until 2039, with H obliged to pay the mortgage and other household outgoings.

But H failed to comply. Mortgages went unpaid, properties were repossessed or sold off, and W faced mounting costs. In March 2025 she applied to enforce and vary the Final Order.

Enforcement – the limits of compliance

The Court heard evidence of repeated non-compliance by H. He failed to pay mortgage instalments, did not transfer properties as ordered, and even engaged in transactions designed to frustrate enforcement. Mr Justice Poole was blunt: H had been “prepared to see his children be compelled to leave their family home rather than comply with his obligations.”

Enforcement orders were therefore essential – requiring H to meet arrears, pay costs, and indemnify W in relation to certain liabilities .

Variation – section 31 MCA 1973 and the Thwaite jurisdiction

The more complex issue was whether the Final Order could be varied. Under s.31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, periodical payments orders (including those framed as undertakings) can be varied or capitalised into a lump sum. The Court applied the principles from Pearce v Pearce [2003], capitalising periodical payments using the Duxbury formula.

Separately, the Court considered the so-called Thwaite jurisdiction (Thwaite v Thwaite [1981] 2 FLR 280). Where an order is still executory (not yet fully implemented) and there has been a significant change in circumstances, the Court may vary it if it would be inequitable not to. Here, the loss of WLH through repossession and H’s persistent default amounted to just such a change .

What was ordered?

H’s undertaking to pay the mortgage until 2039 was discharged and replaced with a capitalised lump sum of £11m, reflecting what he should have paid.
Other claimed costs (such as legal fees and property expenses) were not included, as they went beyond the scope of the Final Order.
Periodical payments linked to staff and household costs were replaced with quantified orders, making enforcement simpler.

Practical lessons

Final doesn’t always mean final – Where an order remains executory, the Court can revisit it under Thwaite if compliance breaks down.
Evidence is key – W succeeded in part, but failed on some claims because she could not prove the sums were properly incurred. Even in high-value cases, documentary evidence matters.
Capitalisation as protection – Courts may prefer a lump sum to uncertain periodical payments where a payer repeatedly defaults.
Procedure is flexible – Although W’s application was technically issued under the wrong procedure, the Court cured the defect to avoid injustice.

Conclusion

Collardeau v Fuchs is a striking reminder that family law orders are living instruments. They can be enforced with teeth, but also adapted when circumstances fundamentally change. For practitioners, it reinforces the importance of distinguishing between true finality and executory obligations – and of ensuring applications are backed by clear, persuasive evidence.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, Collardeau v Fuchs, enforcement, s.31 mca 1973, ultra hnw, variation

Older Posts ›

When Litigation Conduct Crosses the Line: Lessons from RKV v JWC [2025] EWFC 430 (B)

Fraud, Delay and Final Orders: Lessons from Silberschmidt v Richards [2025] EWHC 2841 (Fam)

Risk, Liquidity and Fairness: Key Lessons from BY v GC (No. 2) [2025] EWFC 397

When “Set in Stone” Isn’t: Varying Maintenance and Escaping Old Undertakings in ABC v XYZ [2025] EWFC 370 (B)

Liquidity, Needs and Transparency: Key Lessons from NI v AD [2025] EWHC 2997 (Fam)

When Time Is Short: Terminal Illness and the Court’s Discretion in Financial Remedy Cases

Can You Redact Payee Details from Bank Statements in Family Proceedings?

When Divorce Crosses Borders: Financial Relief After a Foreign Divorce in TY v XA [2025] EWFC 349

Enforcing and Varying Financial Orders: What Collardeau v Fuchs Teaches Us

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