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6 February 2026

Big changes to Family Court preparation from March 2026 – what you need to know

From Monday 2 March 2026, the Family Court is introducing the most significant overhaul of case‑preparation rules in years. A new Practice Direction 27A (PD27A) replaces the old guidance on court bundles and applies across all family proceedings – children cases, financial remedies, and public law alike.

If you are involved in family court proceedings, this matters. These rules affect what documents are prepared, how long they can be, when they must be filed, and what happens if parties get it wrong. For lawyers, PD27A will quickly become a day‑to‑day reference point. For clients, it explains why courts are now insisting on tighter, earlier and more disciplined preparation.

What is changing?

In short: less paper, earlier preparation, and stricter enforcement.

The new PD27A is described by the judiciary as “universal”. It is designed to impose consistency across the Family Court and Family Division, and it carries explicit sanctions for non‑compliance – including hearings being removed from the list and adverse or wasted costs orders.

There is also a small technical change to the appeal rules (FPR r.30.3) coming into force on the same day, but that affects appeal mechanics rather than day‑to‑day case preparation. The real shift is PD27A.

1.Who is responsible for preparing the bundle?

The starting point is simple:

The applicant prepares the bundle.
If there are cross‑applications, responsibility falls on the party who issued first.
If the applicant is a litigant in person and a respondent has a lawyer, the represented respondent must prepare the bundle.

Only in rare cases – where everyone is unrepresented and genuinely unable to compile a bundle – may the court direct HMCTS to do so. Even then, HMCTS‑prepared bundles are treated as an exception, not the norm.

2.Electronic bundles are now the default

PD27A makes clear that, unless there are exceptional circumstances, court bundles should be electronic.

Paper bundles may still be required if:

the court directs one for a judge, witness or litigant in person;
live evidence is realistically expected and suitable technology is not available.

But the direction of travel is clear: e‑bundles first, paper only if justified.

What can – and cannot – go into a bundle

One of the strongest themes in the new PD is discipline.

Bundles must contain only documents that are relevant and necessary for the specific hearing. PD27A now expressly states that certain materials must not be included unless the court orders otherwise, including:

general correspondence and emails;
social media messages and voice notes;
bank statements and contact notes;
foster carer logs and entire social services files;
photographs.

This is a cultural shift. The days of “everything just in case” bundles are over.

If a party wants the bundle to be in Welsh, that must be flagged in advance of the first hearing so the court can give directions.

Page limits: shorter, sharper documents

PD27A imposes clear page limits unless the court directs otherwise. Examples include:

Case summary: 6 pages
Statement of issues: 2 pages
Chronology: 10 pages
Witness statements: 25 pages
Expert reports: 40 pages, including a 4‑page executive summary

Authorities must go in a separate bundle, normally capped at 10 authorities, and head‑noted reports must be used instead of transcripts where available. Hyperlinks are encouraged, particularly where a litigant in person is involved.

3.Position statements and skeleton arguments

Financial remedy cases

In financial remedy proceedings, PD27A now treats “position statements” broadly – they include what lawyers would traditionally call skeleton arguments.

Strict length limits apply depending on the hearing:

First appointment: 6 pages
Interim hearings: 8 pages
FDR: 12 pages
Final hearing: 15 pages

Each hearing requires a fresh position statement. These documents must define the issues, cross‑refer to the bundle, and must not introduce new evidence or exhibits. They must also explain what attempts at negotiation or non‑court dispute resolution have taken place.

High Court financial remedy cases remain subject to the separate guidance on the efficient conduct of those hearings.

All other family proceedings

In children and public law cases, position statements should ordinarily not exceed 3 pages. Skeleton arguments remain separate documents where needed. Public law cases must use the standardised templates now mandated by the court.

4.Mandatory preliminary documents

PD27A now prescribes what must be filed before hearings.

Financial remedy cases

The bundle must include, among other things:

ES1 – a composite case summary;
ES2 – a composite schedule of assets and income;
any FM5 (non‑court dispute resolution statement);
a composite chronology;
each party’s position statement;
a list of essential reading;
for hearings of two hours or more, a realistic hearing timetable, allowing proper reading and judgment time.

Other proceedings (including children cases)

Required documents include:

a (usually agreed) case summary and statement of issues;
position statements;
any FM5;
skeleton arguments where appropriate;
an agreed chronology and reading list;
a hearing timetable for contested or final hearings.

5.Earlier deadlines: the new default timetable

Unless the court orders otherwise:

Parties must try to agree bundle contents at least 7 working days before the hearing.
The bundle must be filed and served no later than 5 working days before the hearing.
Any outstanding preliminary documents must be filed by 11:00 a.m. on the working day before the hearing.

Once filed, the bundle cannot be changed without permission. If extra documents are allowed, they must be provided separately and the revised bundle re‑filed.

This is a meaningful shift from the old PD27A and requires cases to be organised earlier than many practitioners – and clients – are used to.

6.Technical standards (yes, they matter)

The new PD is unusually detailed about format:

PDF e‑bundles only;
default 350‑page limit unless permission is granted;
proper pagination, indexing and bookmarking;
OCR‑enabled text;
accessibility‑conscious fonts and spacing;
file optimisation to avoid oversized uploads.

Judges will see immediately if these standards are not met.

7.What happens if parties ignore the rules?

PD27A could not be clearer:

“Failure to comply with any part of this practice direction may result in the court removing the case from the list… and may also result in an adverse costs order or a wasted costs order.”

This is not window‑dressing. The court is being given explicit permission to enforce compliance.

8.Why this matters in practice

For clients, PD27A explains why lawyers are now insisting on:

tighter document control;
earlier drafting and decision‑making;
fewer but more focused documents;
clearer explanations of settlement efforts.

For practitioners, it marks a shift towards auditable, judge‑facing case preparation, with little tolerance for over‑lawyering or last‑minute chaos.

The message from the court is simple: prepare earlier, prepare better, and keep it proportionate.

If you are involved in family proceedings and would like advice on how these changes affect your case, or what the court will now expect, feel free to get in touch.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: bundles, PD27A, practice and procedure, practice direction

5 February 2026

When Pensions Blur the Line: Matrimonial and Non-Matrimonial Property in BS v HC [2026] EWFC 20

One of the most difficult — and often misunderstood — areas of financial remedy law is the distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property. That difficulty is magnified when the asset in question is a pension, particularly a long-standing defined benefit scheme that predates the marriage but grows substantially during it. BS v HC is a careful and highly instructive judgment on exactly these issues.

The core dispute

The marriage was a long one, lasting around 15 years. The non-pension assets were agreed to be fully matrimonial and were divided equally. The real battleground was the husband’s pension provision, worth just over £3 million, compared with the wife’s modest pension of around £35,000.

The central question for HHJ Edward Hess was this: to what extent was the husband’s pension matrimonial property, and to what extent should it remain non-matrimonial and only available to meet needs?

Source still matters

The judgment strongly reaffirms the orthodox principle that the source of an asset remains critical. Pension rights accrued before the marriage are, in principle, non-matrimonial. The mere fact that a pension grows in value during the marriage does not automatically convert it into matrimonial property.

In this case, much of the husband’s pension derived from service well before the parties met. Although the cash equivalent value increased dramatically during the marriage, that increase was not simply the product of marital endeavour. It was driven by a combination of historic service, scheme funding decisions, macro-economic factors, actuarial methodology and later investment performance.

Apportionment, not arithmetic

A particularly useful feature of the judgment is its rejection of a purely formulaic approach. The court was presented with competing actuarial methodologies — including service-based, cash-equivalent-based and funding-based analyses — each producing radically different answers.

Rather than adopting one method wholesale, HHJ Hess took a broad, evaluative approach, reminding himself that fairness has a “broad horizon”. He concluded that 55% of the pension should be treated as matrimonial and 45% as non-matrimonial.

This reflects a key practical lesson: pension apportionment is not a mathematical exercise but a discretionary one, informed by expert evidence but ultimately driven by fairness.

Matrimonialisation has limits

The wife argued that even if parts of the pension started as non-matrimonial, it had become fully matrimonialised over time. The court rejected that argument.

Drawing on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Standish v Standish, HHJ Hess emphasised that matrimonialisation depends on how the parties have treated the asset over time. Unlike cash or property, pensions are rarely “mingled” during a marriage. They remain in one party’s name and are often untouched until retirement.

Here, there was insufficient evidence that the parties had treated the husband’s pension as a shared asset in a way that justified full matrimonialisation. Contributions to the marriage from other sources — even very substantial ones — did not, without more, convert the pension into matrimonial property.

Needs still provide a safety net

Having determined the sharing position, the court then stood back and tested the outcome against needs. The wife received:

an equal share of non-pension assets;
a mortgage-free home;
a 27.5% pension sharing order against the husband’s main pension.

That provision was sufficient to meet her reasonable income and housing needs, meaning there was no justification for further invasion of the husband’s non-matrimonial pension entitlement.

Why this case matters

BS v HC is a clear reminder that:

growth does not equal matrimonialisation;
pensions require nuanced, fact-specific analysis;
expert evidence informs but does not dictate the outcome; and
the court’s ultimate task is fairness, not accountancy.

For practitioners and clients alike, the message is reassuringly consistent: non-matrimonial property remains protected, but not untouchable — and pensions sit right at the centre of that balancing exercise.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, HHJ Hess, matrimonialisation, non matrimonial assets, pensions, standish v standish

2 February 2026

When Conduct Undermines a Prenup: Lessons from Loh v Loh Gronager [2025] EWFC 483

Pre‑nuptial agreements are often presented as the ultimate form of certainty in financial remedy proceedings. Properly drafted, independently advised, and entered into freely, they are intended to provide clarity, limit dispute, and avoid costly litigation. But Loh v Loh‑Gronager is a powerful reminder that even the strongest prenup is not a licence to behave badly — and that conduct can still play a decisive role where fairness is put at risk.

The background

The parties entered into a detailed and sophisticated pre‑nuptial agreement which the court accepted was fully compliant with the principles in Radmacher v Granatino. The agreement disapplied sharing and compensation and limited the husband’s entitlement by reference to the length of the marriage. On its face, that would have produced an award of around £6.4 million.

However, the husband’s ultimate award was reduced to approximately £2.3 million. The reason lay not in needs, nor in any technical defect in the agreement, but in his conduct — both during the marriage and in the litigation itself.

Prenups do not authorise self‑help

One of the most striking features of the judgment is the court’s rejection of the husband’s apparent belief that the prenup entitled him to treat joint funds as his own. Cusworth J was clear that joint accounts and jointly held monies have a defined purpose, and unilateral withdrawals for personal use — even where one party asserts tacit approval or lack of objection — are not justified.

The court was unimpressed by arguments that the wife could have monitored the accounts more closely or that silence amounted to consent. A prenup may regulate what happens on divorce, but it does not rewrite the basic principles governing joint property during the marriage.

When conduct crosses the threshold

Conduct arguments in financial remedy cases rarely succeed, and the bar remains high. This case illustrates precisely what is required to meet the statutory test of conduct that would be “inequitable to disregard” under section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

Cusworth J found that the husband’s behaviour went well beyond ordinary marital or litigation friction. It included:

repeated misuse of joint and ring‑fenced funds;
secretive financial dealings;
intimidation and harassment;
and, most seriously, the fabrication and manipulation of documentary evidence.

This was not conduct being punished for its own sake. The judge carefully linked it to fairness, credibility, and the integrity of the proceedings, concluding that it would be unjust to allow the husband to receive the full benefit of the prenup in those circumstances.

Fabricated evidence: a line rarely crossed

Findings of fabricated evidence are unusual and profoundly damaging. Cusworth J described this as among the most serious forms of litigation misconduct encountered in the Family Court. Once such findings were made, the husband’s credibility was fatally undermined and his case infected throughout.

The judgment is a stark warning that attempts to manufacture or doctor evidence are likely to backfire catastrophically, affecting not just costs but the substantive outcome itself.

Fairness under Radmacher

Importantly, the court did not treat conduct and the enforceability of the prenup as separate exercises. Instead, Cusworth J analysed whether it would be fair to hold the parties to the agreement in light of the husband’s behaviour. In doing so, he effectively aligned the Radmacher fairness test with the statutory conduct principles, demonstrating how the two operate together rather than in isolation.

Costs and proportionality

The case also stands as a sobering illustration of litigation excess. The parties incurred almost £4.8 million in legal costs to determine an entitlement ultimately fixed at £2.3 million. The judge observed that something had “gone very wrong”, highlighting the destructive potential of entrenched positions and aggressive litigation strategies.

Why this case matters

Loh v Loh‑Gronager is not simply a high‑net‑worth cautionary tale. It reinforces several key principles:

prenups do not excuse financial misconduct;
conduct can still materially affect outcome in truly exceptional cases;
dishonesty in proceedings is likely to be met with severe consequences; and
litigation strategy can be just as important as legal entitlement.

For clients and practitioners alike, the message is clear: certainty only works when matched with integrity. A prenup may set the framework, but fairness — and behaviour — still matter.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, conduct, litigation conduct, litigation misconduct, pre nup, prenuptial agreements, radmacher

26 January 2026

When Conduct Changes Everything: Fraud, Coercive Control and Financial Penalties

In financial remedy proceedings, the court is famously reluctant to allow “conduct” to influence outcomes. The bar is deliberately set high. Most behaviour — even unpleasant, unfair or morally questionable conduct — is excluded from the financial equation.

But LP v MP [2025] EWFC 473 is one of those rare cases where conduct was so serious, so sustained and so financially consequential that it fundamentally altered the distribution of assets. The result? The wife’s financial award was reduced by 40%.

This judgment is an important reminder that while conduct arguments are rarely successful, when they succeed, the impact can be dramatic.

The Legal Test: Why Conduct Rarely Matters

Under section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the court may take account of conduct only if: “it would be inequitable to disregard it.”

This is an exceptionally high threshold. The authorities make clear that:

Bad behaviour during the marriage is usually irrelevant
Emotional wrongdoing rarely qualifies
Financial misconduct must be gross, obvious and directly linked to financial outcomes

Most conduct arguments fail. But not this one.

The Allegations: Fraud and Coercive Control

The husband alleged that throughout the marriage and financial proceedings, the wife had engaged in:

Fraudulent financial behaviour
Systematic deception
Coercive and controlling conduct
Manipulation of financial structures
Deliberate obstruction of disclosure

The court undertook a detailed forensic examination of:

banking records
company accounts
financial transfers
patterns of behaviour
credibility across multiple hearings

The findings were stark. The wife had, over a prolonged period:

hidden and manipulated assets
misrepresented her financial position
exerted coercive control to dominate financial decision-making
and attempted to distort the litigation process itself

This was not incidental misconduct. It was a sustained financial strategy.

Why This Crossed the Conduct Threshold

The court found that the wife’s conduct:

Directly affected the asset base, and
Deliberately undermined the court’s ability to achieve fairness

This was not simply unpleasant behaviour — it corrupted the financial exercise itself. As the judge made clear, allowing the wife to benefit fully from sharing principles in these circumstances would: “offend the court’s sense of justice”. That is the precise point at which section 25(2)(g) is triggered.

The Outcome: A 40% Reduction in Award

Ordinarily, this was a case that would have produced an equal division of assets. Instead, the court imposed a 40% reduction in the wife’s entitlement. This is an enormous adjustment by family law standards. The court was explicit: this was not punitive, but corrective — designed to:

strip out the financial advantage gained through fraud,
neutralise the economic effects of coercive control, and
restore fairness to the overall outcome.

Cusworth J’s Restatement of the Law on Conduct

In setting out the legal framework, Cusworth J drew together the leading modern authorities on conduct in financial remedy proceedings. He adopted the structured approach in OG v AG [2020] EWFC 52, where Mostyn J identified four distinct categories in which conduct may become relevant, and emphasised the need to avoid double-counting. He further relied on Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130, in which Peel J confirmed that conduct must be strictly proved, must cross a high statutory threshold, and must have a clear causative financial consequence. That approach was reinforced by the Court of Appeal in Goddard-Watts v Goddard-Watts [2023] EWCA Civ 115, confirming that conduct is not punitive and ordinarily requires measurable financial impact, with litigation misconduct normally addressed through costs. Finally, he noted Peel J’s clarification in N v J [2024] EWFC 184, which reaffirmed that even where misconduct is serious, it should only affect the substantive award where there is a demonstrable financial consequence.

Coercive Control: A Growing Theme in Financial Remedies

This judgment is particularly significant for its treatment of coercive and controlling behaviour in the financial context. Traditionally, coercive control has featured primarily in:

domestic abuse cases
child arrangements proceedings

LP v MP shows how coercive control can also be highly relevant to financial remedy proceedings, particularly where it:

distorts financial decision-making
suppresses the other spouse’s autonomy
and drives unfair financial outcomes

This reflects a broader judicial recognition that financial dominance can be a powerful and abusive dynamic, deserving serious scrutiny.

Why This Case Matters

LP v MP is exceptional — but that is exactly why it matters. It confirms that:

Conduct arguments remain alive — but only in extreme cases

The threshold is high, but not unreachable.

Fraud and coercive control are now firmly within the court’s financial radar

This is not just about hidden bank accounts — it is about financial power and manipulation.

Courts will impose heavy financial consequences where fairness demands it

A 40% adjustment is rare — and speaks volumes.

Litigation conduct and marital conduct can overlap

Where behaviour corrupts the financial process itself, the court will intervene.

The Bigger Message

Family law is fundamentally a jurisdiction of fairness. While it avoids moral judgment, it cannot ignore deliberate financial wrongdoing. LP v MP sends a clear warning: those who manipulate, deceive or financially dominate their spouse risk losing the protection of the sharing principle altogether. In extreme cases, conduct does not merely influence the outcome — it reshapes it.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, conduct, financial misconduct

23 December 2025

Keeping the Peace at Christmas: A Family Lawyer’s Guide to Managing Holiday Pressures

The festive season is often marketed as a time of joy, connection and togetherness. Advertisements promise glowing fires, full tables and effortless family harmony. But for many families — particularly those navigating separation, divorce or blended family arrangements — Christmas can be one of the most emotionally charged times of the year.

As a family lawyer, I see this every December. Clients want nothing more than a calm, happy Christmas for their children, yet tensions often rise just as the decorations come out. Old disagreements resurface, expectations collide, and the pressure to deliver the “perfect Christmas” can leave everyone feeling drained rather than fulfilled.

The good news is that a calmer festive season is often achievable with a little foresight and realism. Here are five practical principles I regularly share with clients to help reduce conflict and protect children during the holidays.

Plan early — and put it in writing if needed

Christmas arrangements should never be left until the last minute. If you are separated, agree holiday contact well in advance. Who will the children be with, and when? How will handovers work? What about extended family commitments or travel?

Planning early reduces the risk of last-minute disputes and gives children the reassurance of knowing what to expect. Where communication is difficult, a solicitor or mediator can help formalise arrangements in a way that is fair, workable and child-focused — often preventing conflict before it starts.

Keep children out of adult conflict

Christmas can be particularly unsettling for children in separated families. They do not want to choose between parents, nor should they be asked to. What children value most is predictability, reassurance and emotional safety.

Simple steps — such as maintaining familiar routines, respecting agreed arrangements and avoiding negative comments about the other parent — can make an enormous difference. Even small, shared traditions across households can help children feel secure and connected.

Let go of “perfect” Christmas expectations

One of the biggest sources of stress is the belief that Christmas must look a certain way. Family life changes. Separation, bereavement or blended families can make old traditions impractical or emotionally loaded.

That does not mean Christmas is ruined — just different. Embracing flexibility and creating new traditions that reflect your current reality often leads to happier memories than trying to recreate a version of the past that no longer fits.

Pause before reacting

Family gatherings can bring long-standing tensions to the surface. A thoughtless comment, a logistical hiccup or a perceived slight can quickly escalate.

Before responding — whether in person or by message — take a moment to pause. Ask yourself whether the issue truly matters, and how the exchange might affect the children watching. Stepping back is often enough to prevent a small disagreement from becoming a lasting row.

Seek support sooner rather than later

If Christmas feels overwhelming, you do not have to carry that burden alone. Professional support — whether from a counsellor, mediator or family lawyer — can provide clarity and perspective at a difficult time.

Early legal advice, in particular, can prevent misunderstandings from escalating and help put sensible arrangements in place. Seeking help is not a sign of failure; it is often the most effective way to protect yourself and your family.

Looking beyond Christmas

Christmas rarely fixes underlying problems. In fact, it often brings them into sharper focus. Each January, I meet clients who have reached a turning point — deciding that the New Year is the time to formalise arrangements, resolve financial uncertainty or simply find a calmer way forward.

If that sounds familiar, remember this: separation does not have to mean conflict. With the right advice and support, it is possible to co-parent constructively, reduce stress, and move into the New Year with clarity, dignity and peace of mind.

From all of us at James Thornton Family Law, we wish you a peaceful Christmas and a hopeful New Year. Whatever challenges this season brings, remember that you are not alone — and that calmer, more secure arrangements are possible with the right support. We look forward to helping clients move into 2026 with practical, compassionate advice whenever you might need it.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: christmas, new year

19 December 2025

When the Court Can’t Yet Make an Order: Indications of Outcome, Adult Dependent Children and Financial Needs

VP v SP [2025] EWFC 447 (B) is a quietly important reminder of two things family lawyers sometimes take for granted: first, that jurisdiction in financial remedy proceedings is still anchored to decree nisi (or conditional order), and second, how profoundly adult dependent children can shape outcomes on “needs”, even after childhood has long passed.

An “indication” rather than an order

The most striking procedural feature of this case is that the court could not make a financial remedy order at all.

Despite a fully contested final hearing, the divorce had stalled. This was a pre-2022 fault-based petition, initially defended, and no decree nisi (or conditional order) had yet been pronounced. That created a hard jurisdictional stop. As the judge reaffirmed, any financial order made before decree nisi would be a nullity (Munks v Munks).

The solution was pragmatic but important: the judgment was framed expressly as an indication of outcome, to take effect only once decree nisi is pronounced, relying on the approach endorsed in JP v NP and FPR 29.15. No rehearing would be required; the court had done the work, but the order would wait for jurisdiction to crystallise.

For practitioners, this is a useful illustration of what happens when divorce procedure lags behind financial remedy proceedings. The court will not rescue parties from basic sequencing errors — but it may, where appropriate, indicate the result to avoid wasted costs and duplication.

Needs still dominate — even where sharing might suggest equality

On the substance, this was not a “big money” case. The net assets were modest, largely tied up in the former family home. Both parties broadly accepted that this was a needs-driven case rather than one involving surplus wealth.

Yet the outcome was far from equal. The wife ultimately received around 71–73% of the assets, a substantial departure from equality in a 12-year marriage.

Why? Because needs here were not theoretical. They were real, long-term and immovable.

Adult dependent children: not first consideration, but still decisive

The parties’ son was 18 — legally an adult — but profoundly disabled and extremely unlikely ever to live independently. He lived with the mother, who was his full-time carer and would be so indefinitely.

The judgment is careful on the statutory framework. Section 25’s “first consideration” (children under 18) no longer applied. But the court made clear that adult dependent children remain highly relevant when assessing a party’s financial needs, obligations and responsibilities.

This was not treated as a marginal factor. The mother’s caring role effectively extinguished her earning capacity, shaped her housing needs, and justified a much larger capital share to provide long-term security — not just for her, but for her son’s future care.

The court also recognised an uncomfortable reality: as the mother ages, her own ability to care will diminish, increasing future costs rather than reducing them.

Housing reality over housing theory

Another notable feature was the court’s realism about housing. Even with a majority share of the equity, the wife could not realistically buy suitable accommodation — particularly one capable of being adapted for her son’s needs. Renting with a substantial capital buffer was therefore treated as a legitimate and necessary outcome.

By contrast, the husband’s position was softened by the possibility (though not the certainty) of remaining in the former family home with the assistance of his adult son. That potential safety net mattered — even though the court was careful not to treat it as guaranteed.

Needs were assessed not in isolation, but in the context of what each party could realistically do with the resources available.

A reminder about conduct — and restraint

Although the background included findings of domestic abuse in children proceedings, and the litigation history was lengthy and fraught, this was not ultimately treated as a conduct case under s.25(2)(g). The judge drew a clear line between serious background issues and conduct so inequitable it should affect distribution.

That restraint is instructive. Even in emotionally charged cases, the court remains slow to weaponise conduct unless the statutory threshold is met.

Why this case matters

VP v SP is not a headline-grabbing decision, but it is an excellent example of careful, disciplined financial remedy decision-making:

it shows how courts deal with jurisdictional roadblocks without derailing proceedings;
it reinforces that needs still trump sharing where the facts demand it;
and it underlines the enduring significance of adult dependent children in financial outcomes.

Above all, it reminds us that family law outcomes are not driven by abstract percentages, but by lived reality — and sometimes, the most important orders are the ones the court is not yet allowed to make.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, conditional order, decree nisi, dependent adult child, needs

15 December 2025

Arbitration, Confidentiality and Court Orders: Lessons from Spencer v Spencer [2025] EWFC 431

Family law arbitration has long been promoted as a private, efficient alternative to litigation. But what happens when an arbitration award collides with parallel High Court proceedings — and the losing party wants to use confidential arbitral material to defend their reputation in open court?

Mr Justice Peel's judgment in Rt Hon The Countess Karen Anne Spencer v Rt Hon The Ninth Earl Spencer [2025] EWFC 431 provides a rare and important look at the interface between family arbitration, confidentiality, media litigation, and the extent to which an arbitration award can be deployed outside the financial remedy arena. It also illustrates, in stark terms, that converting an arbitral award into a court order is usually straightforward — until external litigation and reputational concerns push against the protective walls of confidentiality.

The backdrop: Arbitration meets the King’s Bench Division

The Spencer divorce was referred to arbitration under the Family Law Arbitration Scheme (ARB1FS) in 2024. The parties chose arbitration for one obvious reason: privacy.

However, shortly afterwards, the husband’s partner, Professor Jarman, issued King’s Bench proceedings against the wife for alleged misuse of personal information. Offers were made, including a Part 36 offer, and these became entwined with the arbitration because:

the arbitrator expected the wife to accept the Part 36 offer,
the husband was required to indemnify her against any sums owed,
and the financial outcome of that separate litigation would directly affect the arbitral award.

The arbitrator permitted a limited set of paragraphs from the award to be disclosed to the parties’ media lawyers and, if needed, into the King’s Bench proceedings. These paragraphs explained why the wife was being encouraged — financially incentivised, even — to accept the offer.

This limited disclosure would later become the battleground.

The problem: How much of an arbitration can you reveal?

When both parties applied to convert the arbitration award into a financial remedy order, the wife sought to go further. She wanted:

disclosure of additional portions of the arbitral award,
disclosure of the arbitrator’s explanatory email in full,
permission to use arbitral material publicly to “defend her reputation”,
and, at one point, permission to place the entire award in the public domain.

This was a bold request — and one that pushes directly against the foundational principle of family arbitration: confidentiality.

The law: Confidentiality is the rule, but not an absolute one

Peel J surveyed the key authorities:

Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners — arbitration is private and confidential.
Article 16.1 of the Family Arbitration Rules — confidentiality applies unless disclosure is necessary to challenge, enforce, or implement an award.
The well-recognised exceptions: consent, court permission, necessity to protect legitimate interests, or the interests of justice.

He also analysed the competing Article 6, 8 and 10 rights:

fair trial,
privacy/reputation,
freedom of expression.

In short: the court had to balance the wife’s right to defend herself in open litigation against the husband’s right to the private process both parties contracted for.

The decision: The award can become an order — but disclosure remains tightly controlled

Peel J allowed:

the conversion of the arbitration award into a court order (uncontroversial),
disclosure of the already-authorised paragraphs,
and disclosure of parts of the arbitrator’s 24 July 2025 email, as they were “reasonably necessary” for the King’s Bench judge to understand the context of the settlement.

But he firmly refused:

wider disclosure to the media,
use of confidential arbitral material for general reputational management,
disclosure of the full award into the King’s Bench proceedings,
and any pre-emptive publication of arbitration documents before they were aired in open court.

To grant such requests, he said, would "drive a coach and horses through the confidentiality central to the arbitration process."

The message is unmistakable: arbitration confidentiality means something — and courts will defend it.

The wider lessons for family practitioners

This case is particularly important because it is unusual. Most arbitration awards sail smoothly into orders without any satellite litigation. But when reputational disputes spill over into open court:

Arbitration confidentiality is not absolute, but the threshold for breaching it is high.
Disclosure will only extend as far as is strictly necessary for fairness in linked litigation.
Parties must think carefully about the interaction between arbitration and parallel civil claims, especially where media allegations are involved.
Arbitration does not give licence for publicity battles. The court will not permit parties to weaponise confidential material to manage their public image.

Conclusion

Spencer v Spencer is a reminder that arbitration remains a robust and confidential alternative to court — but privacy is not invincibility. When external litigation forces its way in, the family court will allow disclosure only to the minimum extent required for justice, and no further. For separating couples considering arbitration, this judgment reinforces both its strengths and its limits: you can choose privacy, but you cannot always control the world outside it.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: arbitration, case law, confidentiality, privacy

12 December 2025

When Litigation Conduct Crosses the Line: Lessons from RKV v JWC [2025] EWFC 430 (B)

If family law has a recurring theme, it is this: the financial remedy process works best when both parties engage honestly, promptly and proportionately. When one spouse turns the proceedings into a prolonged, combative campaign, the court’s patience wears thin — and the outcome can shift dramatically.

RKV v JWC [2025] EWFC 430 (B) is a stark illustration of litigation conduct at its very worst. Despite a net asset base of around £4 million, the husband’s behaviour throughout the litigation was, in the judge’s words, “absolutely appalling”. The judgment reads as a reminder — and a warning — that litigation conduct is not a mere sideshow. It can affect credibility, disclosure findings, and, in extreme cases, even the final division of wealth.

A Case That Should Have Been Simple — But Wasn’t

On paper, this was a straightforward case: a long marriage, a comfortable lifestyle, and an asset base that called for a broadly equal division.

But the husband’s conduct derailed everything.

The judgment records:

Persistent failures to disclose documents
Late evidence, often served only after repeated orders
Aggressive, obstructive correspondence
Missing deadlines without justification
Attempts to relitigate settled issues
Unfounded allegations, adding time and cost
A general refusal to cooperate unless forced by the court

This was not a one-off lapse in compliance — it was a pattern.

As the judge noted, the husband “treated the court process with contempt,” driving up the wife’s costs and obscuring the real financial picture.

What Litigation Conduct Actually Means

Litigation conduct is not simply “being difficult.”
It must be:

serious,
unreasonable, and
have financial consequences for the other party.

In financial remedy work, the court distinguishes between:

Bad behaviour during the marriage — not usually relevant

and

Bad behaviour within the litigation itself — can have costs and fairness consequences.

Where conduct impedes the court’s ability to determine the true financial position, it becomes relevant to both costs and the overall award.

That is exactly what happened in RKV v JWC.

The Outcome: Equality Survived — But Not Because the Husband Deserved It

Despite the husband’s conduct, the court still upheld an equal division of the £4 million asset base.

Why?

Because the wife did not argue that the husband should be penalised via a departure from equality. Instead, she sought — and received — a substantial costs order to reflect the damage his conduct had caused.

Had she pushed for a distribution adjustment, the judge signalled the door was open.
Indeed, the judgment makes clear that in an appropriate case, litigation conduct can justify a shift away from 50/50.

The reasoning is simple:
If one party forces the other to incur enormous avoidable expense, a costs order alone may not put them back in the position they should have been.

The Real Lesson: Costs Are Not the Court’s Only Tool

Courts are increasingly willing to:

Draw adverse inferences where disclosure is obstructed
Accept the evidence of one party where the other is unreliable
Penalise parties with costs orders running into the hundreds of thousands
Depart from equality where conduct has financial consequence
Condense hearings or bypass unnecessary litigation steps to prevent manipulation of process

In other words, litigation conduct now functions as a material factor in the fairness assessment, not a footnote.

RKV v JWC is part of a growing line of cases — including OG v AG, MRU v ECR, OO v QQ and Azarmi-Movafagh v Bassiri-Dezfouli — demonstrating that parties who abuse the process will not succeed.

Closing Thoughts

The message from RKV v JWC is clear: Litigation conduct isn’t just about manners — it’s about justice.

A spouse who obstructs disclosure, ignores court orders, or inflames proceedings may find that the supposed “tactics” cost them far more in the end. The Family Court will not allow one party’s misconduct to distort the process or drain the other’s resources unchecked.

In a jurisdiction built on fairness, transparency and cooperation, RKV v JWC is a strong reminder that how parties behave in litigation can be almost as important as what they own.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, litigation conduct, litigation misconduct, og v ag

11 December 2025

Parents, AI and Family Courts: What You Need to Know Before Using ChatGPT

Generative AI tools like ChatGPT have become part of everyday life. Parents use them for everything from writing emails to getting quick legal explanations. But in family court proceedings, especially care cases, using an AI assistant isn’t as simple—or as safe—as it might seem.

In fact, a parent pasting details of their case into a public AI tool can accidentally commit contempt of court, a criminal offence, or cause serious problems with the evidence in their case.

The judiciary has published refreshed guidance on AI use. That guidance emphasises that private court information must never be entered into a public AI tool — exactly the kind of mistake parents might make if they treat AI like an ordinary word-processor.

The updated guidance is blunt: AI “hallucinations” — made-up cases, misquotations, misleading summaries — are real and recurring. Judges are warned not to paste confidential documents into public AI tools. Anything entered should be treated as if “published to the world.”

This isn’t just a heads-up for judges: it signals that courts take AI misuse seriously. If even judges are cautioned to treat AI output as public and unverified, it’s a strong indicator for parents and litigants-in-person that the risks are more than theoretical.

Here’s what every parent (and practitioner) needs to know.

The family court is a private space—and AI tools are “third parties”

Most children cases are held in private. The law tightly restricts who can see or receive information about the case. In England and Wales, the two big rules are:

Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 – which makes it contempt to publish “information relating to” private children proceedings; and
Section 97 of the Children Act 1989 – a criminal offence to publish anything likely to identify a child during ongoing proceedings.

“Publish” doesn’t just mean posting on Facebook. It includes sharing information with anyone who isn’t legally allowed to receive it. An AI platform, even one you use privately, counts as a third party.

So when a parent copies a social worker’s statement or a court order into ChatGPT to “summarise,” they may well have communicated prohibited information. Anonymising the text doesn’t solve the issue—if the content relates to the case, the restriction usually still applies.

The Family Procedure Rules reinforce this: parents can only share information with a small list of people (lawyers, experts, certain professionals). AI tools are not on that list.

The transparency reforms don’t give parents new freedoms

From January 2025, accredited journalists and legal bloggers can report more about family cases under a Transparency Order. This has caused understandable confusion.

But these reforms only change what reporters may publish—not what parents can share.

Parents remain under the same strict confidentiality duties unless the judge gives explicit permission.

Data protection matters too

Many court documents in care proceedings contain sensitive personal data: medical records, police material, education and safeguarding information. Sharing this data with an AI provider can amount to disclosing personal data without the controller’s consent, which is a criminal offence under the Data Protection Act 2018.

Even if a parent is acting for personal reasons, the law still restricts what they can share from documents controlled by the court, local authority or Cafcass.

AI makes mistakes—and sometimes makes things up

Judges are increasingly warning parents about “hallucinations,” invented legal authorities, and the ease with which AI can produce fake messages, altered images or false transcripts.

Submitting AI-generated material to the court can lead to:

contempt for a false statement of truth;
findings that a parent has attempted to mislead the court;
or, in extreme cases, criminal investigation.

And AI output is not expert evidence. Without the court’s permission, it carries no weight.

Deepfakes and harassment: the criminal cross-over

AI tools that generate sexualised images or impersonate someone’s voice are now firmly on the radar of the criminal courts. Sharing or threatening to share intimate deepfake images is already an offence. Further offences covering the creation of deepfakes are expected to come into force soon.

If one parent uses AI to harass, impersonate or monitor the other, the family court can make non-molestation orders banning that behaviour. Breach is a criminal offence.

What should parents do?

The safest rule is simple:

Do not upload anything from your family case into a public AI system.

If a parent genuinely needs help understanding documents, they should speak to their solicitor or ask the court for appropriate directions. Judges are alive to the pressures on unrepresented parents and would much rather answer questions than deal with accidental contempt.

In short, AI can be a helpful everyday tool—but within family proceedings, it carries serious legal risks. A moment of convenience can have far-reaching consequences. Parents should tread carefully, seek proper advice, and keep their case where it legally belongs: in the privacy of the family court, not the cloud.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: AI, CHATGPT, contempt of court, hallucinations

4 December 2025

Fraud, Delay and Final Orders: Lessons from Silberschmidt v Richards [2025] EWHC 2841 (Fam)

Setting aside a final financial order is one of the most serious steps the Family Court can take. It disrupts finality, unravels what the parties thought was settled, and reopens litigation that may have been dormant for years. Because of this, the bar for reopening a case is high — but not insurmountable, particularly where there is fraudulent non-disclosure.

The recent decision in Silberschmidt v Richards addresses a question that regularly troubles practitioners: If a spouse discovers fraud years after the final order, but waits before issuing their application, can delay alone defeat an otherwise meritorious claim?

The answer from the High Court: Yes — in theory. But only where the delay makes a fair trial impossible. And on the facts of this case, the appeal against reopening the order was dismissed.

The Background: Fraudulent Non-Disclosure at the Heart

The wife applied to set aside a consent order years after it had been made, arguing that the husband had suppressed key financial information during the original proceedings. The judge at first instance accepted that her application had merit and that there was a real prospect that the husband had fraudulently failed to disclose significant assets.

The husband appealed, but not on the fraud issue. Instead, he argued:

The wife waited too long to bring the application once she suspected wrongdoing;
This delay meant the court should not have reopened the final order; and
The judge had not properly addressed whether the delay was, in itself, fatal.

This made the case a perfect vehicle for clarifying the law on delay in fraudulent non-disclosure set-aside claims.

Fraud Still Trumps Finality — But Only If a Fair Trial Is Possible

Mr Justice Poole, dismissing the appeal, reaffirmed the classic starting point:

Fraud “unravels all” — but not at any cost.
Delay may defeat a set-aside application, but only where it renders the litigation unfair or the evidence impossible to evaluate.

The High Court emphasised three guiding principles:

The Court Must Balance Finality Against Justice

Finality is important, but it cannot be used as a shield for a spouse who deliberately misled the court.

Delay Is Not Determinative Unless It Causes Irredeemable Prejudice

The key question is prejudice, not simply the passage of time.

The court looks at:

Has evidence been lost?
Are witnesses no longer available?
Has the factual landscape changed so much that truth can no longer be established?
Would the fraudster suffer unfairness if the matter is reopened?

A Meritorious Claim Should Not Be Shut Out Without Good Reason

Even if delay is long, the court will not bar a claim where:

the fraud can still be fairly investigated;
the spouse did not reasonably discover the fraud earlier;
the alleged wrongdoer caused or contributed to the delay;
the integrity of the original order is fundamentally compromised.

In Silberschmidt v Richards, despite the gap in time, none of the husband’s alleged prejudice was enough to prevent a fair hearing. The wife’s application was therefore properly allowed to proceed.

Why the Appeal Failed

The High Court held that the judge at first instance had:

applied the correct legal test,
acknowledged the delay,
weighed it appropriately within the overall justice of the case, and
concluded (rightly) that a fair investigation was still possible.

In other words, the husband could not convert his own alleged fraudulent non-disclosure into a procedural shield.

Why This Case Matters

This appeal provides valuable clarity for lawyers and clients alike:

Delay can be fatal — but it usually won’t be.

Only where delay makes a fair trial impossible will the court refuse to reopen a consent order tainted by fraud.

Fraud remains the highest-ranking threat to finality.

The overriding objective remains doing justice, not preserving an order built on deceit.

Applicants must act promptly once they have evidence.

A meritorious application will not automatically succeed if a party sleeps on their rights.

Respondents cannot rely on delay they contributed to.

A spouse who has hidden assets cannot complain when the truth eventually emerges.

Closing Thoughts

Silberschmidt v Richards reinforces a simple but crucial principle:
Final orders matter — but honesty matters more.

Where fraud is alleged, the court will look carefully at whether the truth can still be uncovered. If it can, delay will rarely be decisive. For anyone facing the discovery of non-disclosure years after the ink has dried on a consent order, this decision offers clarity — and a fair chance to put things right.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, fraud, non disclosure, set aside

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When Litigation Conduct Crosses the Line: Lessons from RKV v JWC [2025] EWFC 430 (B)

Parents, AI and Family Courts: What You Need to Know Before Using ChatGPT

Fraud, Delay and Final Orders: Lessons from Silberschmidt v Richards [2025] EWHC 2841 (Fam)

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