Blog Archives - Page 2 of 20 - James Thornton Family Law

5 March 2026

When “It’s Our House” Isn’t So Simple: Beneficial Ownership, Parents and Property in Divorce

In Archer v Archer & Ors [2026] EWHC 468 (Fam), the High Court allowed a wife’s appeal against a finding that her husband’s parents were the beneficial owners of a property which, on its face, appeared to form part of the matrimonial landscape.

The case is a reminder of how complicated property ownership can become when family generosity, informal arrangements, and divorce collide.

And for family lawyers, it highlights the growing number of cases where third parties intervene in financial remedy proceedings claiming beneficial ownership of key assets.

The Core Issue: Who Really Owns the Property?

At first instance, the trial judge had accepted that the husband’s parents were the beneficial owners of the property — apparently on the basis of proprietary estoppel arguments.

The effect? The property was effectively removed from the matrimonial pot.

On appeal, however, the High Court took a different view and allowed the wife’s appeal, reopening the question of beneficial ownership.

This matters enormously. In many financial remedy cases, the family home (or an investment property) is the central asset. If it falls outside the marital balance sheet, the financial outcome can shift dramatically.

Why This Case Is So Relevant in Practice

Family lawyers increasingly encounter situations like this:

Parents provide funds for purchase.
A property is placed in a child’s name (or jointly with a spouse).
There is no formal declaration of trust.
Everyone “understands” how things are meant to work.
Divorce then exposes the lack of legal clarity.

When marriage is intact, informal arrangements often function perfectly well. It is only when separation occurs that the cracks appear.

Archer is a reminder that the court will scrutinise:

Legal title
Source of funds
Intention at the time of purchase
Subsequent conduct
Whether proprietary estoppel truly arises

And crucially, appellate courts will intervene where the legal analysis of beneficial ownership has gone astray.

Proprietary Estoppel in the Divorce Context

Proprietary estoppel typically requires:

A representation or assurance
Reliance
Detriment
It being unconscionable to go back on the assurance

In family property disputes, these elements are often blurred by long-standing family relationships and informal understandings.

Archer illustrates the danger of stretching estoppel arguments too far in financial remedy proceedings. Not every parental contribution creates a beneficial interest. Not every expectation crystallises into enforceable equity.

The court must be careful not to conflate:

Generosity
Informal family planning
Moral obligation
with
Legal proprietary rights

Third-Party Interventions: Increasingly Common

The case also reflects a broader trend: parents intervening in their child’s divorce to protect “their” money.

This is especially common where:

There has been intergenerational wealth transfer.
Property is purchased with parental support.
Farming or family business assets are involved.
Cultural expectations of family property differ from legal reality.

But intervention carries risk. Once parents enter the arena, their financial dealings, communications and intentions become subject to forensic scrutiny.

Sometimes the intervention strengthens the case. Sometimes it exposes inconsistencies.

The Wider Message: Document Family Arrangements Properly

If there is one practical takeaway from Archer, it is this: Informal family property arrangements are a litigation timebomb.

If parents intend to:

Retain beneficial ownership,
Create a loan,
Preserve funds as non-matrimonial,
Or protect inheritance expectations,

they should document it clearly at the time of purchase.

A properly drafted declaration of trust can prevent years of costly litigation.

The Divorce Lawyer’s Perspective

From a financial remedy perspective, Archer reminds us that:

Legal ownership is not always determinative.
Beneficial ownership must be properly analysed.
Third-party claims can fundamentally alter the asset schedule.
Appeals will succeed where first-instance reasoning strays from orthodox property law principles.

It also reinforces something we see regularly in practice: The line between “family money” and “matrimonial money” is rarely as clear as people assume.

Final Thought

Divorce has a way of turning informal understandings into legal battlegrounds. Archer v Archer shows how fragile undocumented family property arrangements can be — and how decisive proper legal analysis is when beneficial ownership is disputed.

For anyone purchasing property with family assistance, the lesson is simple: Clarity at the beginning is far cheaper than litigation at the end.

And for those facing divorce where third-party claims arise — early specialist advice is essential.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, parental contribution, Proprietary Estoppel

4 March 2026

When Experience Isn’t Enough: Litigants in Person, Representation and the Reality of Financial Remedy Litigation

The recent decision in XX v GH [2026] EWFC 51 (B) is not, on its face, about divorce settlements or asset division. Instead, it addresses a technical — but hugely significant — issue: Who is legally entitled to conduct litigation in financial remedy proceedings.

Yet beneath the regulatory question lies a much broader and more pressing theme: the growing strain on the family justice system, the rise of litigants in person, and the risks of navigating complex financial proceedings without properly authorised representation.

The Case in Brief

In XX v GH, the court was asked to grant a Chartered Legal Executive an exemption allowing her to conduct litigation in financial remedy proceedings.

Following the High Court decision in Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys (currently under appeal), it is clear that conducting litigation is a “reserved legal activity” under the Legal Services Act 2007. Unless authorised or exempt, a person simply cannot carry out core litigation tasks such as:

Issuing proceedings
Signing statements of case
Filing court documents
Instructing counsel
Making substantive case management decisions

The applicant in XX v GH was an extremely experienced Chartered Legal Executive. The judge accepted she was highly competent and would likely qualify for authorisation via the new regulatory routes.

But competence was not the test.

The court refused the exemption. There was nothing “exceptional” about the case that justified bypassing Parliament’s statutory framework. The message was clear: experience alone does not displace the regulatory structure.

Why This Matters Beyond Regulation

At first glance, this may seem like an internal professional issue. It is not.

This decision highlights a wider access-to-justice tension. Since the withdrawal of most legal aid for private family finance cases, there has been a marked increase in litigants in person. Financial remedy proceedings are now frequently conducted with one — or sometimes both — parties unrepresented.

Financial remedy litigation is technically demanding. It involves:

Strict disclosure obligations (Form E and beyond)
Complex asset tracing
Business and pension valuation evidence
Case management hearings (FDA, FDR, PTR)
Offers strategy and costs risk
Nuanced application of section 25 factors

Even experienced professionals can struggle with the procedural intensity. For litigants in person, the challenge is immense.

The Hidden Risks of “Going It Alone”

Many separating spouses assume financial remedy is simply a matter of “listing the assets and splitting them fairly”.

In reality:

Failure to provide proper disclosure can lead to adverse inferences or costs orders.
Poorly framed offers can have significant financial consequences.
Inadequate evidence can undermine otherwise strong claims.
Procedural missteps can cause delay, stress and spiralling expense.

The court in XX v GH emphasised deference to Parliament’s intention that only authorised individuals conduct litigation. That intention is rooted in public protection — ensuring competence, regulation, and accountability.

The same public protection logic applies to parties themselves. Representation is not a luxury; in many financial cases, it is risk management.

The Rise of Litigants in Person: A System Under Pressure

Judges regularly acknowledge the difficulties faced by unrepresented parties. Court lists are stretched. Hearings take longer. Procedural misunderstandings are common.

But sympathy does not change outcomes.

The court must still apply:

The statutory framework
Procedural rules
Disclosure obligations
The law on needs, sharing and compensation

Financial remedy is discretionary but highly structured. Without early advice, parties often:

Anchor themselves to unrealistic expectations
Fail to gather the right financial evidence
Misjudge litigation risk
Miss opportunities for negotiated settlement

Ironically, attempting to save costs at the outset can dramatically increase them in the long run.

Early Advice Is Cost-Effective — Not Cost-Creating

One of the most persistent misconceptions in family finance is that instructing a specialist lawyer will “make things more adversarial”.

In practice, the opposite is often true.

Early specialist advice can:

Clarify the realistic range of outcomes
Narrow issues from the outset
Shape sensible open offers
Avoid procedural pitfalls
Encourage effective non-court dispute resolution

It is often far cheaper to obtain focused early advice than to attempt to unwind mistakes later — particularly once proceedings are underway.

Representation Is About Strategy, Not Just Paperwork

Financial remedy litigation is not simply about completing forms. It is about:

Strategic timing of offers
Understanding evidential burdens
Managing judicial expectations
Protecting credibility
Knowing when to press and when to compromise

The judge in XX v GH refused the exemption not because the legal executive lacked ability, but because the statutory framework required formal authorisation. Structure and safeguards matter.

For litigants, the principle is similar: structure, expertise and strategic oversight matter enormously in financial cases.

A Final Thought

XX v GH is, technically, a regulatory case. But it serves as a wider reminder of something fundamental in family finance:

Financial remedy proceedings are complex, high-stakes and procedurally unforgiving.

While many people understandably try to minimise upfront legal spend, the long-term financial impact of proceeding without proper advice can be far greater than the cost of early, specialist representation.

If you are facing financial remedy proceedings — or even contemplating them — the most cost-effective step you can take is to seek clear, strategic advice at the earliest stage.

In family finance cases, preparation is not aggression. It is protection.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, legal executive, lip, litigants in person, mazur

20 February 2026

Costs in Financial Remedy Proceedings: When “No Order” Becomes a £275,000 Bill

Costs in financial remedy proceedings are often described as the exception rather than the rule. The starting point under FPR 2010 r.28.3 is clear: no order as to costs.

But as the recent decision in LP v MP [2026] EWFC 36 demonstrates, that starting point can shift dramatically where litigation misconduct is serious. In that case, the wife was ordered to pay £275,000 towards the husband’s costs following findings of litigation misconduct in the substantive proceedings.

For practitioners and litigants alike, the message is simple: conduct matters — and it can be expensive.

The Legal Framework: Why Costs Are Different in Financial Remedy Cases

Unlike most civil litigation, financial remedy proceedings do not operate under a “loser pays” regime. The rationale is policy-driven: the court is engaged in a discretionary redistribution exercise under s.25 MCA 1973, not adjudicating a conventional claim.

However, r.28.3(6) sets out the factors the court must consider when deciding whether to depart from the no-order principle. These include:

Conduct in relation to the proceedings (including compliance with orders),
Whether it was reasonable to pursue or contest a particular issue,
The manner in which a party has pursued or responded to the application,
Any open offers to settle.

The focus is squarely on litigation conduct, not simply moral blameworthiness.

What Happened in LP v MP?

In the substantive judgment, the court made strong findings about the wife’s conduct in the litigation. That misconduct then became the foundation of the husband’s subsequent costs application.

The court concluded that the wife’s behaviour went well beyond ordinary forensic robustness. It fell into the category of conduct that justified a clear departure from the usual rule — resulting in a substantial costs order of £275,000.

While costs awards of this magnitude remain relatively unusual in financial remedy proceedings, they are no longer rare where the court finds:

Deliberate non-disclosure,
Tactical obstruction,
Serious procedural non-compliance,
Or abusive litigation behaviour designed to drive up costs.

The court was not imposing a “penalty”. It was compensating the innocent party for costs unnecessarily incurred due to the other party’s litigation misconduct.

Substantive Conduct vs Litigation Conduct

It is important not to conflate two distinct concepts:

Conduct under s.25(2)(g) MCA 1973 — which may (in rare cases) affect the substantive award.
Litigation misconduct — which generally affects costs.

The appellate authorities have consistently emphasised that substantive conduct must usually have a clear financial consequence before it affects the distribution. Litigation misconduct, however, sits in a different category and is ordinarily addressed through costs.

LP v MP is a clear reminder that even where the substantive award has been determined, the financial consequences of how a party conducted the litigation can still be significant.

Procedure: How to Seek a Costs Order

If you are acting for a party seeking costs in financial remedy proceedings, procedural discipline is critical.

Give Notice

A party seeking costs must make that clear at the appropriate hearing. It should not come as an ambush.

File a Schedule of Costs

A detailed, properly prepared schedule is essential. It should:

Be proportionate,
Identify costs attributable to misconduct where possible,
Be supported by evidence.

Link Conduct to Costs

The court will want to understand:

What conduct occurred,
Why it was unreasonable,
How it caused additional or wasted costs.

Vague complaints rarely succeed. Specificity wins.

Be Realistic

Even where misconduct is established, the court retains discretion. It may:

Order a proportion of costs,
Limit costs to a defined issue,
Or reduce the amount claimed if disproportionate.

Practical Tips to Avoid a Costs Order

For litigants and practitioners:

Comply meticulously with directions and disclosure obligations.
Avoid advancing hopeless arguments purely for leverage.
Keep correspondence measured and proportionate.
Make sensible open offers — they remain highly relevant.
Think carefully before escalating satellite disputes.

Costs awards in this arena are often driven by cumulative behaviour rather than a single misstep.

A Broader Trend?

Over recent years, there has been a discernible judicial willingness to enforce procedural discipline more robustly in financial remedy cases. Courts are increasingly prepared to:

Penalise serious disclosure failures,
Sanction deliberate delay,
Protect parties from abusive litigation strategies.

LP v MP sits squarely within that trajectory.

Final Thoughts

The “no order as to costs” principle should not be mistaken for immunity. It is a starting point — not a shield. Financial remedy proceedings are discretionary, fact-sensitive, and often emotionally charged. But they are still litigation. And where a party’s conduct drives unnecessary expense, the court has both the jurisdiction and the willingness to respond.

In LP v MP, that response was £275,000.

A sobering reminder that in family finance, how you litigate can be almost as important as what you litigate.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, costs, litigation conduct, litigation misconduct

18 February 2026

When “50/50” Isn’t Equal: Pensions, Needs and the Myth of Forensic Accounting

The decision in JK v LM [2026] EWFC 32 is a quietly instructive reminder of how the Family Court actually approaches fairness in a mid-range “needs” case — and why arguments about micro-accounting, add-backs and pre-marital assets so often miss the point.

On paper, this was not a complex case. The parties were both 50. Two children aged 11 and 9. Total assets of around £2.3 million. No business structures. No trusts. No inherited estates.

Yet over £200,000 was spent on legal costs.

And in the end? The non-pension assets were divided 50.8% / 49.2%.

But the pensions were divided 65% / 35% in the wife’s favour.

Why?

A “Needs” Case With Enough — But Not Surplus

The court was clear: this was a needs case, not a sharing case driven by surplus wealth.

Both parties needed:

Housing near the children
Stability for school and commuting
A workable clean break

The wife was the primary carer. She needed a three-bedroom property in the local area. The husband needed a suitable two-to-three bedroom home nearby for contact.

The judge’s approach was orthodox — following the principles summarised by Peel J in WC v HC — computation first, then distribution, with needs dominating.

Even pre-marital rental properties were included in the pot because, realistically, both parties would have to rely on them to meet housing needs.

This is an important practical lesson: Non-matrimonial arguments often collapse in medium-asset needs cases.

The Add-Back That Went Nowhere

The wife advanced an “add-back” claim of almost £200,000, alleging dissipation and post-separation imbalance.

The court rejected it entirely.

The judge reiterated the high threshold for add-back: it must involve clear, wanton or reckless dissipation. Poor financial decisions or uneven interim contributions do not suffice.

Crucially, the court declined to conduct a forensic accounting exercise covering the separation period. That exercise was described as artificial and futile.

This is a message many litigants need to hear. The court will almost always take the asset position as it stands at final hearing, unless there is truly egregious conduct.

Trying to “rebalance” every mortgage payment and bill rarely succeeds — and frequently inflates costs.

Soft or Hard? Family Loans Matter

The wife owed money to her mother under written agreements, with interest, and had been making repayments.

Applying the guidance in P v Q [2022] EWFC 9, the court treated this as a hard obligation.

That reduced the wife’s available capital.

Family loans are often dismissed as “soft”. This case shows that properly structured, documented and enforced loans — even from elderly parents — will be recognised.

The Real Interest: Pension Apportionment

The most interesting feature of the case lies in the pensions.

The wife had:

Two entirely pre-marital pensions
A current employment pension built partly during the marriage

The husband argued for full equalisation of pension income.

The wife sought to ring-fence her pre-marital pensions.

The court’s solution was nuanced:

The two wholly pre-marital pensions were excluded entirely.
The current employment pension was shared in full (without complex marital apportionment).
The result: roughly 65% of overall pension capital remained with the wife, 35% with the husband.

This reflects two key themes:

(a) Pensions are treated differently from housing capital

Housing needs are immediate. Retirement needs are decades away.

The court was unwilling to invade clearly pre-marital pensions to meet a future, non-pressing need.

(b) Fairness does not mean identical retirement outcomes

The husband argued that he had invested less into pensions during the marriage because he expected rental properties to fund retirement.

The court gave that argument some weight — but not enough to justify equality.

Instead, it struck a balance between:

The non-matrimonial origin of part of the wife’s pension wealth
The husband’s future earning capacity
The clean break

The Outcome: Almost Equal Capital, Unequal Pensions

Non-pension assets:
50.8% / 49.2%

Pensions (CETV basis):
65% / 35% in wife’s favour

This was not a departure from fairness. It was fairness applied differently to different asset classes.

That distinction is often misunderstood.

The Human Reality

One of the most telling passages in the judgment notes that both parties were fundamentally honest, decent, likeable people.

Yet they pursued tiny historic expenditure claims dating back to 2012. Filed four conduct statements. Made allegations about jewellery. Had disputes about children’s accounts. Spent over £200,000 in costs.

The court’s final division was almost equal.

The judge observed that this case “should not have been difficult to resolve.”

Key Takeaways for Clients and Practitioners

In needs cases, pre-marital property is vulnerable — especially housing assets.
Add-back claims rarely succeed.
Family loans must be properly documented to be treated as hard debts.
Pensions are not automatically equalised.
Retirement fairness is contextual — not mathematical.
Litigating micro-contributions almost never changes the outcome.

Final Reflection

This case is a textbook example of how English family law actually works:

Not punitive.
Not forensic.
Not obsessed with exact equality.

But pragmatic.

Fairness is not about who paid which bill in 2016. It is about ensuring both parties — and especially the children — emerge from the litigation housed, secure and able to move forward.

And sometimes, after two years of hard litigation, fairness looks remarkably close to 50/50.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: 50/50, add back, case law, equality, financial fairness, needs, pensions, soft loan

17 February 2026

Overseas Divorce, English Property: 90% of the Home to the Wife

The recent decision in Fisayo Olaoluwa Awolowo v Olusegun Samuel Awolowo is a striking reminder of the power of the English court to intervene financially following a foreign divorce — and of how decisive housing needs can be where the former matrimonial home is the only significant asset.

The Background: A Nigerian Divorce, an English Asset

The parties had divorced in Nigeria. However, the only substantial asset was the former matrimonial home in England. The wife pursued financial relief in this jurisdiction under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.

This is often misunderstood. An overseas divorce does not prevent an application in England where there is a sufficient connection and where justice requires further financial provision.

In this case, the court ultimately ordered the sale of the former matrimonial home, with 90% of the proceeds to the wife.

That is a significant departure from equality — and worth examining.

Needs Trump Sharing (When There’s Only One Asset)

Where there is a single substantial asset — particularly a home — the court’s focus inevitably sharpens around housing needs.

There was no vast asset schedule here. No offshore structures. No business valuations. Just a property.

The decision reflects a well-established but sometimes uncomfortable truth: When resources are limited, needs dominate.

An equal division would not have met the wife’s housing requirements. The court therefore adjusted the division to achieve fairness in practical terms — not theoretical equality.

Part III: Not a Second Bite — But a Safety Net

Applications following overseas divorce are not designed to allow forum shopping or duplication. The court must consider whether:

There is a sufficient connection to England and Wales;
It is appropriate for the court to exercise jurisdiction;
Further financial provision is justified.

The case underlines that where there has been little or no meaningful financial resolution abroad — and where an English property is central — the court will not hesitate to step in.

Points of Wider Interest for Practitioners

The Former Matrimonial Home Remains Powerful

Even in modest cases, the family home retains emotional and practical primacy. Where children or primary care arrangements are involved, the housing need analysis can significantly skew division percentages.

Equality Is Not the Starting Point in Every Case

While sharing is a fundamental principle in big money cases, where assets are limited the court often moves quickly to a needs-based outcome.

Enforcement and International Dimensions Matter

Where a divorce occurs abroad but assets are here, strategic decisions about jurisdiction can be outcome-determinative. Early specialist advice is critical.

A Broader Reflection

This case is a reminder that family law is rarely about percentages in the abstract. It is about practical outcomes — roofs over heads, stability for children, and fairness in context.

Where there is only one meaningful asset, the court’s task is brutally binary: If one party receives enough to house themselves adequately, the other may have to accept significantly less.

That can feel harsh — but it reflects the statutory obligation to achieve fairness within finite resources.

If you are dealing with an overseas divorce but assets in England — particularly property — the jurisdictional landscape is complex and time-sensitive. Early advice can make all the difference.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, overseas, overseas divorce, part III MFPA 1984, Part III relief

13 February 2026

Lifestyle vs. Disclosure – When the Numbers Don’t Add Up: Lessons from MK v SK [2026] EWFC 28

The recent decision in MK v SK is a striking reminder of three enduring principles in financial remedy litigation:

The duty of full and frank disclosure is absolute.
The court is entitled – and sometimes compelled – to draw robust inferences.
Attempts to present as impecunious while living well are rarely successful.

In this case, the husband maintained that his assets were “almost nil”. The court disagreed – emphatically. By the end of the judgment, he was found to have access to (or control over) several million pounds and was ordered to pay a lump sum of over £2 million to the wife.

The Central Issue: Was the Husband Really Broke?

On paper, the husband’s case was one of scarcity. In reality, the evidence told a very different story.

The court analysed:

Inconsistent disclosure
Opaque financial structures
Lifestyle evidence inconsistent with alleged poverty
The movement and control of funds

As so often happens in non-disclosure cases, the absence of transparent documentation did not protect the husband. Instead, it damaged his credibility.

Where a party fails to give proper disclosure, the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences. That is not a punishment. It is a forensic necessity. If one spouse controls the financial narrative and refuses clarity, the court must construct the picture from the available material.

In MK v SK, that reconstruction was not favourable to the husband.

Lifestyle as Evidence

One of the most interesting aspects of this case is the court’s reliance on lifestyle analysis.

It is increasingly common for judges to scrutinise:

Spending patterns
Property occupation
Business dealings
Third-party funding arrangements
The reality of control versus legal ownership

A party asserting near-insolvency while funding substantial legal fees, enjoying high living standards, or moving money internationally will struggle to maintain credibility.

Lifestyle is not determinative. But it is highly probative.

Litigation Conduct and Credibility

This case also underscores a wider theme emerging in recent authorities: litigation conduct matters.

Non-disclosure is not merely a procedural defect. It can fundamentally alter:

The court’s view of credibility
The methodology used to assess resources
The extent to which inference is drawn
Ultimately, the outcome

Judges are increasingly willing to say so explicitly.

Where a party fails to engage properly with disclosure obligations, the court may adopt a broad evaluative approach rather than a narrow accounting exercise. Precision is a luxury reserved for transparent litigants.

The Wider Context

MK v SK sits alongside a line of cases where the court has:

Rejected artificial asset-minimisation
Looked beyond corporate structures
Taken a realistic view of control
Made substantial awards despite claimed poverty

It is a reminder that financial remedy proceedings are not games of concealment. The Family Court is adept at identifying patterns, inconsistencies and implausible explanations.

Practical Takeaways

For practitioners and clients alike:

Full and frank disclosure is not optional

It is the foundation of the entire process.

If documents are missing, explain why

Silence invites inference.

Lifestyle must align with disclosure

Judges are entitled to compare the two.

Credibility once lost is hard to recover

Financial remedy cases often turn less on arithmetic and more on trust.

Final Thoughts

MK v SK is a textbook illustration of what happens when the court concludes that a party’s presentation of their finances is unreliable. The result was a dramatic recalibration: from “almost nil” to a finding of multi-million-pound resources, and a lump sum award exceeding £2 million.

The message is clear. In financial remedy proceedings, transparency protects. Evasion rarely does.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, disclosure, financial disclosure, lifestyle, litigation misconduct, non disclosure

10 February 2026

Litigation Funding That Actually Works: Lessons from DR v ES on Legal Services Payment Orders

Legal Services Payment Orders (LSPOs) are often spoken about as a remedy of last resort. In practice, they can be the difference between a party being able to litigate at all — or being forced into an unfair settlement through lack of funds.

The decision in DR v ES and Ors (Further LSPO Application) [2026] EWFC 15 is a striking example of the court taking a robust, pragmatic approach to litigation funding, and it offers valuable guidance on how LSPO applications should be framed — and when they will succeed.

The Case in Brief

This was not a first LSPO, but a further application, made in long-running and hard-fought financial remedy proceedings. The wife sought additional funding to take her through:

the PTR, and
the final hearing.

The court ordered:

£73,000 to take the wife through to the PTR; and
a further £332,000 from the PTR to the final hearing.

These are substantial figures — and deliberately so.

The court accepted that without this funding, the wife would be unable to litigate effectively, while the husband remained well-resourced.

Why This Case Matters

What makes DR v ES particularly noteworthy is not just the size of the award, but the court’s clear-eyed focus on fairness of process, rather than abstract notions of restraint.

Three themes stand out.

LSPOs are About Equality of Arms — Not Austerity

The court was unpersuaded by arguments that the wife should simply “do with less” or strip her case back to the bare minimum.

An LSPO is not about funding a shoestring case; it is about enabling a party to properly present their case, especially where:

the issues are complex,
disclosure is extensive, or
the other party is legally well-armed.

The court recognised that proper preparation costs money, and that denying reasonable funding risks procedural injustice.

Further LSPOs Are Not Exceptional

There is sometimes an assumption that once an LSPO has been made, that is “it”.

This case confirms the opposite. Where circumstances justify it — including the scale of proceedings and what has unfolded since the last order — further LSPOs can and will be made.

The key question is not how many LSPOs there have been, but whether ongoing funding is reasonably required.

The Court Will Look Closely at Realistic Costs

Importantly, the court did not accept vague or inflated figures. The successful application was supported by:

detailed cost schedules,
a clear breakdown by phase, and
justification for the level of work proposed.

This was not a blank cheque — but it was a realistic one.

5 Top Tips: How to Secure an LSPO

Drawing on DR v ES and the wider LSPO jurisprudence, some clear practical lessons emerge.

Evidence Is Everything

A successful LSPO application needs:

clear evidence of lack of available funding, and
proof that commercial borrowing is not realistically available.

Bare assertions will not do.

Be Forensic About Costs

Courts expect:

phase-by-phase costings,
proportionality, and
transparency.

A carefully prepared schedule is far more persuasive than broad estimates.

Show the Consequences of No Order

Judges are particularly alert to the practical impact of refusing an LSPO.

Spell it out: What can’t be done without funding? What prejudice would arise? How would this affect the fairness of the process?

Don’t Be Afraid of a Further Application

If earlier funding has been exhausted due to the scale or conduct of proceedings, a further LSPO is not an indulgence — it may be essential.

Timing Matters

Apply early enough to avoid crisis, but late enough to show the court exactly what lies ahead procedurally and financially.

A Broader Message

DR v ES is a reminder that LSPOs remain a vital tool in ensuring that financial remedy litigation is decided on the merits, not on who can afford the better legal team. Where one party controls the purse strings, the court will not hesitate to intervene — firmly — to ensure fairness.

For litigants and practitioners alike, this case underlines an important truth: access to justice in family law must be practical, not theoretical.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, litigation funding, lspo

9 February 2026

Farming, Partnerships and Divorce: When the Farm Isn’t a Matrimonial Asset – T v T [2025] EWFC 395

Farming cases occupy a distinctive corner of family law. Assets are often valuable, illiquid, generational, and emotionally charged. Add informal business structures, historic accounting practices and land held within families for decades, and it is easy to see why disputes arise. T v T [2025] EWFC 395 is a textbook illustration of these tensions — and a powerful reminder that use of land in a farming business is not the same thing as ownership.

The background

This was a long marriage, with a seamless relationship of some 25 years. The husband farmed in partnership with his father. There was no written partnership deed. The parties lived in the farmhouse for several years and had invested sale proceeds from a former jointly owned home into improvements.

The wife argued that the farmhouse, land and buildings — worth potentially £8–9 million — were partnership assets, giving the husband a substantial beneficial interest which should be brought into the financial remedy pot. If correct, the implications for the wife’s claim were enormous. If wrong, she faced the stark prospect of those assets being entirely out of reach.

The preliminary issue

The court was asked to determine a single but critical question: which assets used by the farming partnership were actually partnership property, giving the husband an interest for divorce purposes?

District Judge Humphreys answered that question decisively: the farmhouse, land and buildings were not partnership assets at all. They belonged solely to the husband’s father, notwithstanding their use by the partnership and their appearance in the accounts.

Accounts are evidence — not destiny

A central plank of the wife’s case was that the land and buildings appeared in the partnership accounts as tangible or fixed assets. But the judgment reinforces a vital principle, particularly relevant in agricultural cases: accounts are not conclusive.

Drawing on authorities such as Ham v Bell and Wild v Wild, the court stressed that accounting treatment may reflect historic practice or tax convenience rather than any legal intention to transfer ownership. Farmers, as the judge noted, “are not paper people — but they know who owns what.”

Here, the land and buildings were consistently shown in the father’s capital account, not shared between the partners. There was no revaluation, no capital gains tax event, and no evidence of any agreement — express or implied — to introduce the land into the partnership.

Intention is everything

The judgment repeatedly returns to one theme: the subjective intention of the partners. One partner cannot unilaterally convert personal property into partnership property. Nor does long use of land for farming purposes achieve that result by osmosis.

The evidence from the husband, his father, the sister/bookkeeper and the long-standing accountant was consistent and compelling. By contrast, the wife ultimately accepted she did not know how or when the assets could ever have been transferred. The burden of proof rested with her — and it was not discharged.

A cautionary tale on changing positions

An uncomfortable feature for the wife was that she had previously brought (and settled) a claim against the father on the basis that he owned the farmhouse outright, receiving £150,000 in compensation. The court did not need to determine issue estoppel, but the shift in position undermined her credibility and weakened her case.

Wider lessons for farming divorces

T v T underlines several recurring themes in farming cases:

Use does not equal ownership: land can be essential to the business without ever becoming a partnership asset.
Generational farms are treated with realism: courts recognise how families operate and how assets are deliberately kept out of reach of business risk.
Informality cuts both ways: the absence of written deeds does not mean courts will infer dramatic transfers of wealth.
Needs still matter: while ownership issues may limit the sharing exercise, housing and income needs remain central at the final hearing.

Final thought

For spouses of farmers, this case is a sobering reminder that living and working on a farm does not guarantee an interest in it. For farming families, it confirms that clear intention — even if unwritten — will be respected. And for advisers, it reinforces the importance of identifying and resolving ownership issues early, before expectations harden into litigation.

In farming divorces, the land may feel like the heart of the case — but as T v T shows, the law will always start by asking a simpler question: who actually owns it?

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, farm, farm business, farming

6 February 2026

Big changes to Family Court preparation from March 2026 – what you need to know

From Monday 2 March 2026, the Family Court is introducing the most significant overhaul of case‑preparation rules in years. A new Practice Direction 27A (PD27A) replaces the old guidance on court bundles and applies across all family proceedings – children cases, financial remedies, and public law alike.

If you are involved in family court proceedings, this matters. These rules affect what documents are prepared, how long they can be, when they must be filed, and what happens if parties get it wrong. For lawyers, PD27A will quickly become a day‑to‑day reference point. For clients, it explains why courts are now insisting on tighter, earlier and more disciplined preparation.

What is changing?

In short: less paper, earlier preparation, and stricter enforcement.

The new PD27A is described by the judiciary as “universal”. It is designed to impose consistency across the Family Court and Family Division, and it carries explicit sanctions for non‑compliance – including hearings being removed from the list and adverse or wasted costs orders.

There is also a small technical change to the appeal rules (FPR r.30.3) coming into force on the same day, but that affects appeal mechanics rather than day‑to‑day case preparation. The real shift is PD27A.

1.Who is responsible for preparing the bundle?

The starting point is simple:

The applicant prepares the bundle.
If there are cross‑applications, responsibility falls on the party who issued first.
If the applicant is a litigant in person and a respondent has a lawyer, the represented respondent must prepare the bundle.

Only in rare cases – where everyone is unrepresented and genuinely unable to compile a bundle – may the court direct HMCTS to do so. Even then, HMCTS‑prepared bundles are treated as an exception, not the norm.

2.Electronic bundles are now the default

PD27A makes clear that, unless there are exceptional circumstances, court bundles should be electronic.

Paper bundles may still be required if:

the court directs one for a judge, witness or litigant in person;
live evidence is realistically expected and suitable technology is not available.

But the direction of travel is clear: e‑bundles first, paper only if justified.

What can – and cannot – go into a bundle

One of the strongest themes in the new PD is discipline.

Bundles must contain only documents that are relevant and necessary for the specific hearing. PD27A now expressly states that certain materials must not be included unless the court orders otherwise, including:

general correspondence and emails;
social media messages and voice notes;
bank statements and contact notes;
foster carer logs and entire social services files;
photographs.

This is a cultural shift. The days of “everything just in case” bundles are over.

If a party wants the bundle to be in Welsh, that must be flagged in advance of the first hearing so the court can give directions.

Page limits: shorter, sharper documents

PD27A imposes clear page limits unless the court directs otherwise. Examples include:

Case summary: 6 pages
Statement of issues: 2 pages
Chronology: 10 pages
Witness statements: 25 pages
Expert reports: 40 pages, including a 4‑page executive summary

Authorities must go in a separate bundle, normally capped at 10 authorities, and head‑noted reports must be used instead of transcripts where available. Hyperlinks are encouraged, particularly where a litigant in person is involved.

3.Position statements and skeleton arguments

Financial remedy cases

In financial remedy proceedings, PD27A now treats “position statements” broadly – they include what lawyers would traditionally call skeleton arguments.

Strict length limits apply depending on the hearing:

First appointment: 6 pages
Interim hearings: 8 pages
FDR: 12 pages
Final hearing: 15 pages

Each hearing requires a fresh position statement. These documents must define the issues, cross‑refer to the bundle, and must not introduce new evidence or exhibits. They must also explain what attempts at negotiation or non‑court dispute resolution have taken place.

High Court financial remedy cases remain subject to the separate guidance on the efficient conduct of those hearings.

All other family proceedings

In children and public law cases, position statements should ordinarily not exceed 3 pages. Skeleton arguments remain separate documents where needed. Public law cases must use the standardised templates now mandated by the court.

4.Mandatory preliminary documents

PD27A now prescribes what must be filed before hearings.

Financial remedy cases

The bundle must include, among other things:

ES1 – a composite case summary;
ES2 – a composite schedule of assets and income;
any FM5 (non‑court dispute resolution statement);
a composite chronology;
each party’s position statement;
a list of essential reading;
for hearings of two hours or more, a realistic hearing timetable, allowing proper reading and judgment time.

Other proceedings (including children cases)

Required documents include:

a (usually agreed) case summary and statement of issues;
position statements;
any FM5;
skeleton arguments where appropriate;
an agreed chronology and reading list;
a hearing timetable for contested or final hearings.

5.Earlier deadlines: the new default timetable

Unless the court orders otherwise:

Parties must try to agree bundle contents at least 7 working days before the hearing.
The bundle must be filed and served no later than 5 working days before the hearing.
Any outstanding preliminary documents must be filed by 11:00 a.m. on the working day before the hearing.

Once filed, the bundle cannot be changed without permission. If extra documents are allowed, they must be provided separately and the revised bundle re‑filed.

This is a meaningful shift from the old PD27A and requires cases to be organised earlier than many practitioners – and clients – are used to.

6.Technical standards (yes, they matter)

The new PD is unusually detailed about format:

PDF e‑bundles only;
default 350‑page limit unless permission is granted;
proper pagination, indexing and bookmarking;
OCR‑enabled text;
accessibility‑conscious fonts and spacing;
file optimisation to avoid oversized uploads.

Judges will see immediately if these standards are not met.

7.What happens if parties ignore the rules?

PD27A could not be clearer:

“Failure to comply with any part of this practice direction may result in the court removing the case from the list… and may also result in an adverse costs order or a wasted costs order.”

This is not window‑dressing. The court is being given explicit permission to enforce compliance.

8.Why this matters in practice

For clients, PD27A explains why lawyers are now insisting on:

tighter document control;
earlier drafting and decision‑making;
fewer but more focused documents;
clearer explanations of settlement efforts.

For practitioners, it marks a shift towards auditable, judge‑facing case preparation, with little tolerance for over‑lawyering or last‑minute chaos.

The message from the court is simple: prepare earlier, prepare better, and keep it proportionate.

If you are involved in family proceedings and would like advice on how these changes affect your case, or what the court will now expect, feel free to get in touch.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: bundles, PD27A, practice and procedure, practice direction

5 February 2026

When Pensions Blur the Line: Matrimonial and Non-Matrimonial Property in BS v HC [2026] EWFC 20

One of the most difficult — and often misunderstood — areas of financial remedy law is the distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property. That difficulty is magnified when the asset in question is a pension, particularly a long-standing defined benefit scheme that predates the marriage but grows substantially during it. BS v HC is a careful and highly instructive judgment on exactly these issues.

The core dispute

The marriage was a long one, lasting around 15 years. The non-pension assets were agreed to be fully matrimonial and were divided equally. The real battleground was the husband’s pension provision, worth just over £3 million, compared with the wife’s modest pension of around £35,000.

The central question for HHJ Edward Hess was this: to what extent was the husband’s pension matrimonial property, and to what extent should it remain non-matrimonial and only available to meet needs?

Source still matters

The judgment strongly reaffirms the orthodox principle that the source of an asset remains critical. Pension rights accrued before the marriage are, in principle, non-matrimonial. The mere fact that a pension grows in value during the marriage does not automatically convert it into matrimonial property.

In this case, much of the husband’s pension derived from service well before the parties met. Although the cash equivalent value increased dramatically during the marriage, that increase was not simply the product of marital endeavour. It was driven by a combination of historic service, scheme funding decisions, macro-economic factors, actuarial methodology and later investment performance.

Apportionment, not arithmetic

A particularly useful feature of the judgment is its rejection of a purely formulaic approach. The court was presented with competing actuarial methodologies — including service-based, cash-equivalent-based and funding-based analyses — each producing radically different answers.

Rather than adopting one method wholesale, HHJ Hess took a broad, evaluative approach, reminding himself that fairness has a “broad horizon”. He concluded that 55% of the pension should be treated as matrimonial and 45% as non-matrimonial.

This reflects a key practical lesson: pension apportionment is not a mathematical exercise but a discretionary one, informed by expert evidence but ultimately driven by fairness.

Matrimonialisation has limits

The wife argued that even if parts of the pension started as non-matrimonial, it had become fully matrimonialised over time. The court rejected that argument.

Drawing on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Standish v Standish, HHJ Hess emphasised that matrimonialisation depends on how the parties have treated the asset over time. Unlike cash or property, pensions are rarely “mingled” during a marriage. They remain in one party’s name and are often untouched until retirement.

Here, there was insufficient evidence that the parties had treated the husband’s pension as a shared asset in a way that justified full matrimonialisation. Contributions to the marriage from other sources — even very substantial ones — did not, without more, convert the pension into matrimonial property.

Needs still provide a safety net

Having determined the sharing position, the court then stood back and tested the outcome against needs. The wife received:

an equal share of non-pension assets;
a mortgage-free home;
a 27.5% pension sharing order against the husband’s main pension.

That provision was sufficient to meet her reasonable income and housing needs, meaning there was no justification for further invasion of the husband’s non-matrimonial pension entitlement.

Why this case matters

BS v HC is a clear reminder that:

growth does not equal matrimonialisation;
pensions require nuanced, fact-specific analysis;
expert evidence informs but does not dictate the outcome; and
the court’s ultimate task is fairness, not accountancy.

For practitioners and clients alike, the message is reassuringly consistent: non-matrimonial property remains protected, but not untouchable — and pensions sit right at the centre of that balancing exercise.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, HHJ Hess, matrimonialisation, non matrimonial assets, pensions, standish v standish

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Costs in Financial Remedy Proceedings: When “No Order” Becomes a £275,000 Bill

When “50/50” Isn’t Equal: Pensions, Needs and the Myth of Forensic Accounting

Overseas Divorce, English Property: 90% of the Home to the Wife

Lifestyle vs. Disclosure – When the Numbers Don’t Add Up: Lessons from MK v SK [2026] EWFC 28

Litigation Funding That Actually Works: Lessons from DR v ES on Legal Services Payment Orders

Farming, Partnerships and Divorce: When the Farm Isn’t a Matrimonial Asset – T v T [2025] EWFC 395

Big changes to Family Court preparation from March 2026 – what you need to know

When Pensions Blur the Line: Matrimonial and Non-Matrimonial Property in BS v HC [2026] EWFC 20

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