Blog Archives - James Thornton Family Law

24 March 2025

Mental Health and Financial Settlements in Family Law: TA v SB [2025] EWFC 61

The recent judgment in TA v SB [2025] EWFC 61 (B) offers a compelling look at how family courts balance financial settlements in cases where one spouse has significant mental health challenges. The case reinforces the principle that fairness does not always mean equality, particularly when a party's vulnerabilities affect their financial needs and earning capacity.

Case Overview: TA v SB

The central issue in TA v SB was the division of the former matrimonial home (FMH) following divorce. The wife (W), who has bipolar disorder, was awarded 57% of the FMH. The husband (H) contended for a more equal division, arguing that his contributions and needs justified a more balanced outcome.

The court ultimately found that W’s mental health condition necessitated a greater share of the asset to ensure her long-term stability. The judgment highlighted that fairness required an assessment of needs, not just a mechanical application of equal division.

The Role of Mental Health in Financial Remedies

This case underscores the court's approach to mental health in financial remedy proceedings. While White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 set the principle of non-discrimination between homemakers and breadwinners, TA v SB demonstrates that where health significantly impacts future earning potential, the court will adjust financial awards accordingly.

The Needs-Based Approach in Financial Remedy Cases

A needs-based approach is a key principle in financial remedy cases, ensuring that a financially weaker spouse, especially one with health vulnerabilities, receives sufficient provision for their future well-being. Courts will depart from an equal division where necessary to ensure financial stability, particularly when the applicant has mental health conditions or long-term medical needs.

Legal Framework for the Needs-Based Approach

While equality is often the starting point in financial settlements (White v White [2001]), courts can adjust division based on reasonable financial needs, as established in:

Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 – Courts can prioritise financial needs over strict equality, particularly where earning capacity is impaired.
Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503 – Reinforces the principle that a fair outcome must consider future financial security, not just historical contributions.

For applicants with health vulnerabilities, needs assessments take on additional significance.

What Courts Consider When Applying the Needs-Based Approach

In cases like TA v SB, where one party has mental health challenges, the court looks at:

Housing Needs – If the applicant requires stable accommodation, the court may award a larger share of the FMH or additional capital to secure appropriate housing.
Medical and Care Costs – Long-term medical treatment, therapy, and support services are factored into financial provision.
Earning Capacity & Employment Prospects – If the applicant’s condition limits future earnings, the court may award higher capital or spousal maintenance (Periodical Payments).
Overall Standard of Living – Courts aim to prevent undue financial hardship, ensuring a reasonable quality of life post-divorce.

How an Applicant Can Strengthen Their Needs-Based Claim

To maximise financial provision under the needs-based approach, an applicant should:

Provide expert medical evidence proving the impact of their condition on their ability to work and manage daily life.
Demonstrate specific financial needs, including medical care, therapy, and housing stability.
Highlight dependency on the financially stronger spouse, if applicable, and justify why equal division would be insufficient.
Argue for spousal maintenance, particularly if they are unable to work or their income is significantly reduced.

Comparison with V v V [2024] EWFC 380

The judgment in TA v SB makes reference to V v V [2024] EWFC 380, a case that, while noted as ‘non-recitable’ as precedent, shares striking similarities. In V v V, one spouse also suffered from a mental health condition that affected their financial independence. The court in that case recognised that maintaining a degree of financial security was essential for the vulnerable party’s well-being, leading to an outcome that favoured need over strict equality.

Both cases illustrate a broader trend in family law, where the court takes a holistic approach, prioritising the needs of the more vulnerable party. While V v V is not binding, it aligns with the principle that fairness in financial remedy cases is highly fact-sensitive.

Judicial Trends and Practical Implications for Family Lawyers

Courts have become more receptive to non-equal divisions where necessary, particularly in cases involving mental health or serious illness. Practitioners should:

Emphasise long-term financial security rather than short-term asset division.
Consider lump sum settlements where ongoing maintenance may be impractical or contested.
Cite recent case law, including TA v SB, to justify a departure from equality based on individual circumstances.

Key Considerations for Family Law Practitioners

Needs trump Equality: Mental health considerations can tilt the balance in financial settlements, leading to outcomes that prioritise stability over a strict 50/50 split.
Judicial discretion matters: The court’s approach remains flexible, emphasising fairness over rigid formulae.
Precedents may be limited: While V v V was cited in TA v SB, its ‘non-recitable’ status means it cannot be relied upon as binding authority. However, it reinforces a trend in the court’s reasoning.
Medical evidence is critical: Demonstrating the long-term financial impact of a mental health condition strengthens a needs-based claim.
Spousal Maintenance may be justified: If earning capacity is compromised, a higher capital award or maintenance provision should be sought.

Conclusion

The judgment in TA v SB serves as an important reminder that financial remedy cases are not solely about division of assets but about ensuring just outcomes tailored to the parties’ realities. Where mental health factors into financial needs, the court remains willing to adjust settlements accordingly, demonstrating a nuanced and empathetic approach to family law disputes.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: bipolar, case law, mental health, needs, ta v sb

19 March 2025

Non-Disclosure and No-Show: How Courts Respond in Financial Remedy Cases – Mahtani v Mahtani [2025] EWFC 35 (Fam)

Mahtani v Mahtani [2025] EWFC 35 (Fam) is a stark reminder of the serious consequences of non-attendance and non-disclosure in financial remedy proceedings. This case serves as yet another warning that attempting to evade scrutiny in divorce cases can lead to adverse inferences and financial penalties.

The Facts: A Husband’s Strategic Silence

In this case, the husband (H) repeatedly failed to comply with court orders for financial disclosure, refused to engage with proceedings, and ultimately did not attend the final hearing. Despite multiple opportunities to provide evidence, he remained uncooperative. The wife (W), on the other hand, had complied with her disclosure obligations and pursued a fair division of assets.

Faced with H’s blatant non-participation, the court had little choice but to proceed in his absence and determine a fair outcome based on the available evidence—most of which was provided by W.

Key Legal Issues: Non-Attendance and Non-Disclosure

The Court’s Approach to Non-Disclosure
- Non-disclosure remains one of the biggest obstacles in financial remedy cases, but courts have developed a clear approach: if a party refuses to disclose assets, the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences.
- The judgment in Mahtani v Mahtani aligns with earlier decisions, including Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, confirming that non-disclosure does not prevent the court from making findings on asset values and appropriate distribution.
- The burden of proof lies on the party alleging non-disclosure, but once a reasonable suspicion is raised, the non-disclosing party must disprove it—a burden H did not even attempt to meet.
Non-Attendance: Proceeding in Absence
- H’s non-attendance at the final hearing was not enough to delay proceedings. The court proceeded on the basis of the evidence before it, emphasising that parties cannot derail litigation by refusing to engage.
- This echoes the approach in BG v BA [2015] EWFC 2, where Mostyn J held that “a party cannot frustrate the process by refusing to take part.”
Adverse Inferences and Asset Estimation
- Given H’s non-disclosure and refusal to engage, the court took a robust approach, estimating his assets at the upper end of W’s valuation evidence.
- Courts have wide discretion to infer hidden assets if a party refuses to be transparent, as seen in Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60 and Thurrock v West [2012] EWCA Civ 1435.

The Judgment: A Cautionary Tale

W was awarded a significant share of the known assets, along with adverse cost consequences for H’s conduct.
The judgment reinforces that non-compliant parties will not be rewarded for obstructive behaviour—instead, courts will take a pragmatic approach and ensure that justice is done based on available information.

Practical Takeaways for Family Lawyers

Non-disclosure is a high-risk strategy—courts are prepared to draw negative inferences, often resulting in a more punitive financial settlement for the non-compliant party.
Non-attendance will not delay judgment—a party who refuses to engage cannot expect the court to wait indefinitely.
Practitioners should advise clients early on the duty of full and frank disclosure—failure to comply can lead to asset assumptions that may not be favourable.
Courts are willing to make robust findings—a lack of disclosure does not mean an absence of judgment.

Conclusion

Mahtani v Mahtani sends a clear message: financial remedy proceedings will not be held hostage by uncooperative litigants. Those who fail to engage do so at their peril—because the court will press ahead, and the outcome is unlikely to favour the non-disclosing party.

For family lawyers, this case reinforces the importance of advising clients on compliance and disclosure obligations. Strategic silence will not win the day—transparency and cooperation remain the best path to a fair outcome.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, mahtani, non attendance, non disclosure

13 March 2025

DF v YB [2025] EWFC 46 (B): A £1.3 Million Litigation Bill and Lessons on Efficiency, Conduct, and Transparency

At first glance, DF v YB [2025] EWFC 46 (B) appears to be a straightforward financial remedy case—a 19-year marriage, an agreed equal division of assets, and no significant conduct arguments. But beneath the surface, this case highlights several key issues for family law practitioners:

The staggering cost of litigation—a combined £1.3 million in legal fees.
The consequences of inefficient case management, particularly non-compliance with the Efficiency Statement.
The continued judicial push for greater transparency, with the judgment being published despite objections.

The £1.3 Million Legal Bill: A Case That Should Have Settled Earlier

The headline figure? £1.3 million spent on legal fees.

The wife (W) spent £566,289 on the financial remedy proceedings and an additional £220,148 on private law children proceedings.
The husband (H) spent £378,611 on the financial remedy case and £115,703 on the children proceedings.

This raises an important question: Why did a case with no major disputes over legal principles end up costing so much?

Both parties agreed from the outset that:
The assets should be divided equally.
There was no need for a maintenance claim—it would be a clean break case.
The assets were sufficient to meet both parties’ needs.

The disagreement? How to calculate the final asset pool and who should pay whom.

The Efficiency Statement Breach: Non-Compliance and the Court’s Frustration

The judgment makes clear that the parties failed to properly comply with the Efficiency Statement (11 January 2022), particularly regarding the Chronology.

The applicant (W) failed to produce a neutral composite Chronology in line with paragraph 21(c) of the Efficiency Statement.
Instead, the court was presented with two competing versions, which wasted time and resources.
Recorder Allen KC explicitly referenced Peel J’s warning in GA v EL [2024] that such breaches are "wholly unacceptable."

Why does this matter? Because courts are increasingly focused on efficient case management. Non-compliance with procedural rules can lead to judicial criticism, wasted costs, and delays.

Conduct: When Bad Behaviour Doesn’t Affect the Award

W presented evidence that H had engaged in abusive and offensive conduct post-separation, including sending misogynistic and threatening messages.

H’s own barrister admitted his behaviour was “wholly unacceptable.”
W’s team tried to use this to frame the case, even though they never formally pleaded conduct as a factor.

But did it impact the financial award? No.

The court ruled that bad behaviour alone is not enough to adjust the financial split unless:
It is of a "highly exceptional nature" (N v J [2024] EWFC 184).
There is an identifiable financial consequence (Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2024] 1 FLR 937).

Since W could not prove a financial link, the court ignored H’s misconduct in the final asset division.

Transparency: Why This Judgment Was Published Despite Objections

H objected to publication, arguing that:
There were no novel legal points in the judgment.
There was no wider public interest in the case.
The children’s privacy could be affected.

W did not oppose publication, provided that the judgment was fully anonymised.

The Court’s Decision: Publish It.

Recorder Allen KC applied the balancing test from Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593, weighing:

The public interest in open justice (ECHR Article 10).

The privacy rights of the family (ECHR Article 8).

Ultimately, the court ruled that:

There is a presumption in favour of publication, even where no legal precedent is set.
Public accountability matters in financial remedy cases, particularly where litigation conduct is an issue.
The judgment should be fully anonymised, but the public has a right to see how financial disputes are resolved.

This aligns with the 2024 Transparency Practice Guidance, which encourages greater publication of financial remedy judgments.

Final Financial Outcome: The Court’s Decision

After lengthy disputes over asset valuation, tax liabilities, and loan repayments, the court ruled:

H to pay W a lump sum of £510,000 (far lower than her £780,000 claim but higher than his £60,000 offer).
The couple’s £13.8 million in assets to be split equally.
A contested loan to be subject to “Wells sharing”, meaning W would get a share only if it was repaid.
H’s tax liabilities were NOT deducted from the asset pool, as the court was unconvinced he would actually pay them.
Both parents to contribute £200,000 each to the children’s education fund.
Child maintenance of £7,500 per year per child, replacing a previous CMS order.

Final Thoughts: A Case Study in High-Conflict Divorce Litigation

At its core, DF v YB [2025] EWFC 46 (B) is a cautionary tale about the cost of financial disputes, inefficiency in litigation, and the limits of conduct arguments.

For family lawyers, the key lessons are:

Early settlement is crucial—protracted disputes over asset valuation can be ruinously expensive.
Procedural compliance matters—courts expect efficiency, and failure to comply can waste costs and time.
Conduct rarely affects financial awards—without a financial impact, even extreme behaviour may be ignored.
Transparency is here to stay—clients must expect their financial disputes to be public, unless they have strong reasons to argue otherwise.

With £1.3 million spent in legal fees, this case proves that even “straightforward” financial disputes can become complex, high-stakes battles. Practitioners should take note—and advise their clients accordingly.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, costs, litigation conduct, litigation misconduct, transparency, wells

11 March 2025

Costs, Anonymity, and Open Justice in Family Law: Lessons from Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 26

The follow-up decision in Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 26 deals with two contentious post-judgment issues: who should pay the costs of the financial remedy proceedings and whether the judgment should be anonymised. With £1.3 million in legal fees, disputed disclosure, and an argument over the principle of open justice, the case is a valuable study in how courts approach litigation misconduct and the growing shift away from anonymisation in family proceedings.

For family law practitioners, this decision serves as a clear warning about the risks of aggressive litigation tactics and a reminder that financial remedy judgments are not guaranteed anonymity.

The Costs Battle: Who Pays for the Litigation?

The wife sought a costs order against the husband, citing his poor litigation conduct, particularly:

Repeated disclosure failures (including the non-disclosure of Bitcoin assets and tax liabilities).
Delays in responding to court orders and failing to engage with the disclosure process.
Refusal to negotiate reasonably, including rejecting mediation attempts.

The husband, however, fought back, claiming he was not the only one guilty of litigation misconduct. He argued that:

The wife had also failed to disclose key financial arrangements, particularly regarding the sale of her football club and consultancy agreement.
She had structured financial transactions in a way that hid assets, misrepresenting £3 million as post-separation income rather than part of the settlement.
She pursued baseless conduct allegations that added to the length and cost of the trial.

The Court’s Approach: Misconduct Cuts Both Ways

Mr Justice MacDonald ruled that both parties were at fault, but the wife’s litigation misconduct was more significant. The court ordered her to pay £84,540 towards the husband’s legal costs, finding that:

🔹 Her financial structuring artificially reduced the settlement pot (particularly regarding her football club sale).
🔹 She exaggerated claims of coercive control and financial misconduct, which the court found had no merit.
🔹 Her conduct made settlement harder to achieve, prolonging litigation unnecessarily.

🔹 However, the judge also acknowledged that the husband had failed to comply with disclosure requirements, leading to additional costs—but these were deemed delays rather than deliberate concealment.

The Anonymity Debate: Open Justice Wins

The wife sought anonymisation of the judgment, arguing that:

The case was heard in private, and there was no significant public interest in revealing the parties' names.
The judgment included details of financial and business dealings, which should remain confidential.
Publication would cause unnecessary reputational harm.

The husband opposed anonymisation, arguing that:

The general rule is open justice—family law litigants are not entitled to special treatment.
The wife’s conduct findings should be public, as the case involved significant misrepresentation of assets.
The financial details were not commercially sensitive, as key business transactions had already been completed.

The Court’s Decision: No Anonymisation

Mr Justice MacDonald ruled that the judgment should be published in full, without anonymisation, applying the principles from Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2022] EWFC 30 and Re PP (A Child) [2023] EWHC 330 (Fam).

The default position is open justice—litigants are not automatically entitled to anonymity.
There was a legitimate public interest in this case, particularly due to the findings on litigation conduct and financial structuring.
The wife’s embarrassment was not a sufficient reason to override the principle of open justice.

Practical Lessons for Family Law Practitioners

Costs Orders Are Becoming More Common in Financial Remedy Cases

While the general rule in FPR 2010 r.28.3 is no costs orders, courts are increasingly penalising litigation misconduct.
Parties must engage reasonably with disclosure and negotiation—or risk costs penalties.

Anonymisation Is No Longer the Norm

Family lawyers should warn clients that judgments may be published with full names.
If anonymity is sought, it must be justified with clear evidence of harm (not just reputational concerns).

Non-Disclosure and Creative Financial Arrangements Will Be Scrutinised

Courts are willing to look beyond surface-level transactions to determine whether assets are being hidden or misrepresented.
Clients should be advised to be fully transparent, as delayed or incomplete disclosure can result in adverse costs orders.

Final Thoughts: The Shift Towards Accountability in Family Law

Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 26 reinforces a shift towards greater accountability in financial remedy proceedings. Courts are:

More willing to make costs orders where one party unreasonably prolongs litigation.
Less inclined to grant anonymity, ensuring that bad litigation conduct is exposed.
Taking a robust approach to non-disclosure, scrutinising creative financial structuring.

For family law practitioners, this case is a clear signal that the courts expect transparency, cooperation, and reasonable litigation conduct. If a client drags out proceedings, makes exaggerated allegations, or misrepresents financial information, they risk both financial penalties and public exposure.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: anonymity, bitcoin, costs, culligan, litigation conduct, litigation misconduct

10 March 2025

From Bitcoin to Football Clubs: The High-Stakes Divorce of Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 1

The financial remedy case of Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 1 is a textbook example of a high-net-worth divorce gone awry. With £27 million at stake, a disputed Bitcoin fortune, a women’s football club sale, and complex tax liabilities, the case raises key issues for family lawyers dealing with long marriages, illiquid assets, and corporate shareholdings.

Here’s what family law practitioners need to know about this decision and the practical lessons it offers.

The Case: A Wealthy but Messy Divorce

Diane Liza Rosemin-Culligan (the wife) and Anthony David Culligan (the husband) had a marriage spanning 40 years. While both agreed that a broadly equal division of assets was appropriate, the fight was over how that division should be structured.

The key issues before Mr Justice MacDonald included:

The valuation and division of the husband’s shares in Colendi, a fintech company.
Whether the wife’s consultancy agreement—paying her £750,000 a year—was actually deferred consideration for the sale of her football club.
Who should bear the significant tax liabilities, including those arising from the husband's U.S. citizenship.
The treatment of the Bitcoin fortune, which had been used to fund both parties’ business ventures.
Allegations of litigation misconduct and non-disclosure by both parties.

Despite the eye-watering sums involved, this case illustrates familiar legal issues: the treatment of illiquid assets, the challenge of attributing hidden income, and the impact of conduct on financial remedy claims.

Key Legal Issues & Lessons for Practitioners

Valuation of Illiquid Assets – The Colendi Shares

A major dispute centred around the husband’s 3.6% shareholding in Colendi, a fintech company that had recently acquired his previous business, SETL Limited.

The single joint expert valued the husband’s Colendi shares at £19 million.
However, the shares were held via a nominee company, meaning they were subject to transfer restrictions that complicated their division.
The court had to determine whether a direct share transfer to the wife was possible—or whether a contingent lump sum should be ordered instead.

When dealing with business assets, transfer restrictions and nominee structures can limit enforceability. Ensure early expert valuation and consider alternative forms of division (e.g., deferred lump sums).

Was the Wife’s £750,000 Salary a “Disguised Asset” in the Football Club Sale?

The wife had built and sold ELSA Sports Services Limited, which owned the London City Lionesses football club. She agreed to a £6 million sale price, but:

She also entered into a consultancy agreement, earning her £750,000 per year for four years.
The husband argued that this was not genuine post-marital income but deferred consideration for the club’s sale, designed to shield the money from the divorce settlement.
The court found that while the consultancy payments were partly legitimate, they should be treated as part of the matrimonial assets.

Courts look beyond the surface of financial transactions—if a deal artificially defers income, it may be reclassified as an asset for division.

The Tax Nightmare of the “Accidental American”

The husband was an “accidental American”—born in the U.S. but with no real ties there. However, this triggered massive U.S. tax liabilities, including:

Capital gains tax on Bitcoin sales.
Tax on U.K. property disposals.
A potential U.S. tax charge on any asset transfers in the divorce.

The court accepted expert evidence that the husband’s tax liabilities ranged from £1.4 million to £1.7 million. The wife sought to avoid any responsibility for these debts, arguing that she should not suffer from her husband’s citizenship status.

The court ruled that:

The husband must bear his own U.S. tax burden.
The wife should not be exposed to unpredictable foreign tax risks.

International tax exposure can drastically affect financial remedy settlements. In cases involving U.S. citizens, specialist tax advice is essential.

Bitcoin Fortunes & Hidden Assets

The case revealed a Bitcoin goldmine:

The husband had purchased over 1,000 Bitcoin in 2012 for £10,000, which skyrocketed in value to £20 million in 2017.
The funds had been used throughout the marriage to finance both the husband’s fintech ventures and the wife’s football club.
The wife accused the husband of hiding additional cryptocurrency wallets, which he later disclosed contained £371,000 in undisclosed Bitcoin.

The court ruled that while the missing Bitcoin was not enough to justify an inference of wider concealment, the husband’s failure to disclose it earlier was litigation misconduct.

Cryptocurrency assets are notoriously difficult to track, making full disclosure essential. Consider early forensic tracing of crypto transactions.

Litigation Misconduct and the Cost of Delay

Both parties accused each other of bad litigation conduct:

The husband was penalised for delayed disclosure of assets, including the Bitcoin wallets and Colendi shareholding structure.
The wife was criticised for a lack of transparency in the football club sale, failing to disclose documents until compelled by court order.

While neither party’s conduct met the high threshold for reducing their financial award under s.25(1)(g) MCA 1973, the court did impose costs penalties on the husband for disclosure failures.

Non-disclosure and litigation misconduct won’t necessarily affect the final award, but they will increase costs exposure. Ensure early compliance with disclosure obligations to avoid judicial criticism.

The Court’s Decision: A “Wells Sharing” Approach

Given the illiquid nature of the Colendi shares, the court adopted a Wells sharing approach (Wells v Wells [2002] EWCA Civ 476), ensuring that both parties shared the risks and rewards of future value fluctuations.

The final order included:
The wife retaining the £7 million former matrimonial home.
The husband keeping his Colendi shares but paying the wife 15% of any future proceeds.
A lump sum payment to equalise liquid assets.
Each party keeping their own businesses and pensions.
The husband bearing his own U.S. tax liabilities.

Final Thoughts: Key Takeaways for Family Lawyers

Illiquid business assets require creative structuring – Courts are increasingly using Wells sharing to divide risky corporate holdings.
Disguised income can be reclassified as a matrimonial asset – Consultancy agreements, bonuses, or deferred deals should be scrutinised.
International tax liabilities can derail settlements – Clients with U.S. citizenship need specialist tax advice early.
Cryptocurrency must be fully disclosed – Courts take non-disclosure of Bitcoin seriously.
Litigation misconduct leads to costs penalties – Delays and strategic non-disclosure can backfire badly.

Culligan v Culligan is a case study in complex asset division—and a reminder that transparency and careful planning are key in high-net-worth divorces.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: bitcoin, case law, cryptocurrency, culligan, football clubs, litigation conduct, litigation misconduct

25 February 2025

When a Consent Order Becomes a Battlefield: Lessons from Grace v Grace [2025] EWFC 37

Family law disputes often come with high emotions, but Grace v Grace [2025] EWFC 37 (B) takes acrimony to a whole new level. What should have been a straightforward financial remedy consent order in April 2022 turned into two and a half years of relentless litigation, over 850 emails to the court, more than 20 separate applications, and allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct.

This case is a cautionary tale about how financial disputes can spiral out of control, the importance of finalising consent orders properly, and the consequences of litigation misconduct. It also raises important points about anonymisation of financial remedy judgments—or, in this case, the lack thereof.

What Happened in Grace v Grace?

Mary-Jane Grace (the wife) and Ian Douglas Grace (the husband) agreed on a financial settlement at a Financial Dispute Resolution (FDR) hearing in April 2022. The deal was relatively straightforward:

The former matrimonial home (FMH) would be transferred to the wife, who would sell it and retain the proceeds.
The husband would keep his commercial properties and a Spanish property.
There would be a clean break.

However, what should have been a final resolution instead descended into chaos.

The Reasons for Delay

Each party blamed the other for the delays:

The wife argued that the husband had hijacked the case by repeatedly filing applications and bombarding the court with endless emails.
The husband alleged that the wife’s solicitor, Mr Gardner, had deliberately altered the terms of the agreement in the typed consent order submitted to the court—something he described as a conspiracy to seize his legal estate.

Over the next two years, the case became bogged down in endless litigation, with the husband making multiple applications, complaints, and even a Judicial Review against HMCTS, the Judiciary, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, and various accountants involved in the case.

Key Legal Issues from the Case

Consent Orders Must Be Properly Finalised

One of the main sources of conflict in this case was the drafting of the consent order. The handwritten agreement made at court in April 2022 was not identical to the typed version submitted later. Although the changes were minor, the husband seized on these discrepancies, arguing they were deliberate alterations that fundamentally changed the settlement.

The court found that:

The differences were insignificant—small wording changes like “charge” vs. “charges” and minor grammatical edits did not affect the substance of the order.
However, errors in drafting should have been corrected quickly, and the solicitor should have ensured the order reflected exactly what was agreed.

Practice Point: Ensure that handwritten agreements made at court are accurately reflected in the final typed consent order to avoid unnecessary disputes.

Litigation Misconduct Can Be Costly

The judge found that the husband had engaged in a relentless campaign of litigation misconduct, including:

Over 850 emails to the court
22+ separate applications
Numerous complaints to regulators
A 13-page formal complaint filed the morning after the final hearing
A 38-page document seeking a General Civil Restraint Order against the wife’s solicitor

The court ruled that:

While the solicitor had made mistakes, the husband’s unreasonable and disproportionate approach was the real cause of delay and ballooning costs.
The husband was ordered to pay £20,000 towards the wife’s legal fees—despite being a litigant in person.

Practice Point: Courts take a dim view of excessive, disproportionate litigation. Unreasonable conduct can lead to adverse costs orders—even against litigants in person.

Anonymisation of Family Court Judgments Is Not Guaranteed

Most financial remedy judgments are anonymised to protect the privacy of the parties. However, in this case, the court decided to name both parties, citing Peel J’s analysis in Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130, which outlines when publication without anonymity is justified.

HHJ Farquhar ruled that:

The case involved serious litigation misconduct that warranted public exposure.
The husband’s campaign of obstruction was so extreme that the case fell into the “public interest” exception.

Practice Point: Anonymisation in financial remedy cases is not automatic. Where there is serious misconduct, courts may choose to name and shame.

Key Points of Note for Family Law Practitioners

Avoid Drafting Disputes – Get the Order Right

Ensure that the typed version of a consent order exactly matches the agreement made in court.
If errors are spotted post-hearing, correct them quickly and transparently to avoid unnecessary disputes.

Litigants in Person Are Not Immune from Costs Orders

The husband’s self-representation did not protect him from a costs order.
Courts will penalise excessive and unreasonable litigation, even when a party acts without a lawyer.

Excessive Applications Will Backfire

The husband’s obsession with perceived injustices led to costly, unnecessary litigation.
Courts will dismiss repetitive applications and can restrict further filings under a Civil Restraint Order.

Anonymity Is Not Automatic

If a party engages in extreme litigation misconduct, courts may refuse anonymity in published judgments.
Financial remedy cases are usually anonymised, but bad behaviour can lead to public exposure.

Final Thoughts: A Case That Should Have Ended in 2022

Grace v Grace should have been a routine consent order. Instead, it dragged on for over two years, consumed thousands of hours of court time, and resulted in spiralling costs for both parties.

For practitioners, this case is a masterclass in what can go wrong when disputes over consent orders are not swiftly resolved. It is also a stark warning about the risks of litigation misconduct—and a reminder that, in extreme cases, anonymity is not guaranteed.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, consent order, grace v grace

20 February 2025

Maintenance Pending Suit: The Art of Holding the Financial Ring – Lessons from SM v BA [2025] EWFC 28

When ultra-high-net-worth couples divorce, the legal battles aren’t just about the final financial settlement—they’re also about how much one party should receive in the interim. The case of SM v BA [2025] EWFC 28 saw the court awarding the wife £29,750 per month in maintenance pending suit (MPS), despite the husband describing her application as “rapacious” and “full of errors.”

This case provides an important reminder of the legal test for MPS, how the courts balance fairness, needs, and the marital standard of living, and why interim awards should not be viewed as a “mini final hearing.”

What Is Maintenance Pending Suit?

Maintenance pending suit (MPS) is a temporary financial order made under section 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. It is designed to provide one party with reasonable maintenance while divorce and financial remedy proceedings are ongoing.

MPS is often sought in cases where one party controls the wealth and the other does not have immediate access to funds. It is particularly important in high-net-worth cases where lifestyle expectations and financial commitments are significant.

The Legal Test for MPS

The law on MPS is well established. The key principles come from TL v ML & Others [2006] 1 FLR 1263, where Mostyn J (then QC) summarised the test:

The sole criterion is “reasonableness”, which is synonymous with fairness.
The marital standard of living is a very important factor, though this does not mean the court will simply replicate it.
A specific MPS budget should be provided, which should exclude capital or long-term expenses best dealt with at the final hearing.
If disclosure is inadequate, the court can make “robust assumptions” about a party’s ability to pay and err in favour of the applicant.
Where a party has historically been supported by third-party wealth, the court may assume that this support will continue, at least until the final hearing.

These principles were later refined in Rattan v Kuwad [2021] 2 FLR 817, where the Court of Appeal confirmed:

The focus is on immediate needs—but “immediate” does not mean “emergency-only” provision.
The marital standard of living remains relevant but does not have to be fully replicated.
The approach to MPS should be flexible, reflecting the circumstances of the case.

SM v BA: A Clash Over £29,750 Per Month

The Background

The wife (SM) sought £43,995 per month plus the payment of various household and family costs, totalling nearly £700,000 per year.
The husband (BA) argued that £24,438 per month was more appropriate, claiming that the wife’s demands were exaggerated.
The court had previously ordered interim maintenance of £29,500 per month, but the wife now sought an increase due to alleged additional costs.

Key Issues Before the Court

What level of maintenance was “reasonable” on an interim basis?
Should the previous agreement of £29,500 per month be upheld or revised?
Was the husband’s financial disclosure adequate?
Did the wife’s claims amount to forensic exaggeration?

The Court’s Decision

Maintenance Set at £29,750 Per Month

The court ordered the husband to pay £29,750 per month, only a small increase from the previous £29,500 per month.

Key factors in this decision:

The marital standard of living was “clearly very high,” even if both parties had slightly exaggerated or downplayed its extent.
The amount was close to the level already agreed between the parties, reducing the need for major revision.
The wife’s budget contained some forensic exaggeration, but the court did not accept the husband’s argument that her claims were excessive across the board.

No Automatic Replication of Marital Lifestyle

The court rejected the idea that MPS should automatically maintain the exact same standard of living. Instead, it emphasised that the award should be fair and reasonable based on the available resources.

This reflects the principle from M v M (Maintenance Pending Suit) [2002] 2 FLR 123, where Charles J stated that the court must not simply replicate the status quo but should instead assess what is reasonable in all the circumstances.

Robust Assumptions About the Husband’s Wealth

The husband argued that he could not afford more than £24,438 per month and disputed the inclusion of certain dividend income in his financial resources.

The court, however, found that:

The husband’s disclosure was incomplete, meaning the court was entitled to draw robust assumptions about his wealth.
There were “additional monies” available to the husband through family business interests, which he had not fully disclosed.
The husband’s past payments of £29,500 per month suggested affordability, despite his argument that it was too high.

This follows the principle from MG v GM (MPS: LSPO) [2023] 1 FLR 253, where Peel J stated that the court can make reasonable inferences when faced with incomplete disclosure.

Key Lessons for Family Law Practitioners

MPS Is About Holding the Financial Ring, Not Deciding the Final Outcome

The purpose of MPS is to keep things stable until the final hearing.
Clients should be advised not to overreach, as forensic exaggeration may weaken their credibility.
Equally, the paying party should be cautious about downplaying their wealth, as courts can draw adverse inferences.

The Marital Standard of Living Matters—But It’s Not Absolute

Courts will consider the lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage, but that does not mean a blank cheque.
Adjustments may be made based on available resources and the need for fairness.

Full and Frank Disclosure Is Critical

If a party fails to provide clear disclosure, courts may err in favour of the applicant.
Hiding assets or claiming financial difficulty without clear evidence can backfire.

Previous Agreements Are Persuasive

If parties previously agreed on a maintenance figure, it can be difficult to argue for a major change without strong justification.
Courts will consider whether circumstances have actually changed since the last agreement.

Final Thoughts: A Case of Careful Balance

The decision in SM v BA [2025] EWFC 28 reinforces that MPS is a temporary solution, designed to balance the needs of both parties without pre-judging the final financial settlement. The award of £29,750 per month shows that courts take a pragmatic, rather than rigid, approach—ensuring that immediate needs are met without necessarily replicating the exact marital lifestyle.

For family lawyers, this case is a reminder to carefully construct interim applications, ensuring that:

Budgets are realistic and well-evidenced.
The marital standard of living is factored in—but not overstated.
Clients are advised against financial posturing, as courts will scrutinise disclosure carefully.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, maintenance pending suit, mps, sm v ba 2025, tl v ml 2006

18 February 2025

Four Houses and a Divorce: The Complexities of Property and Contribution in RM v WP [2024] EWFC 191 (B)

When it comes to dividing assets in a divorce, few things cause as much contention as pre-marital property—especially when there’s more than one house involved. In RM v WP [2024] EWFC 191 (B), the court had to decide whether four properties owned by the husband before the marriage should be shared or whether the wife’s claim should be limited to her financial needs.

The case offers valuable insights into how courts approach long marriages, non-matrimonial assets, and the “matrimonialisation” of property—and serves as a warning that just because a house has been a family home doesn’t necessarily mean it will be shared equally.

The Case: A Marriage and Multiple Homes

RM (the wife) and WP (the husband) had a long marriage, spanning 15 years from 2005 to 2020. At the time of their marriage, the husband already owned four properties, which remained in his sole name:

Two apartments in London
A country cottage
A house in a European country

Over the years, the couple lived in different properties at different times, sometimes together, sometimes separately. When the marriage broke down, the wife argued that since these homes had been used as family residences at different times, they had become matrimonial property, meaning they should be divided equally.

The husband, on the other hand, argued that these properties were his pre-marital assets, had remained in his name throughout, and should not be shared beyond what was necessary to meet the wife’s housing needs.

The Court’s Approach: What Happens When There Are Multiple Homes?

Judge Hess had to decide whether these properties had become matrimonial and, if so, whether they should be divided equally. He outlined key principles:

The Importance of a “Family Home”
- The general rule is that the matrimonial home, even if pre-owned by one party, is usually considered matrimonial property.
- However, when a couple has multiple homes, the situation becomes more complex.
Sequential vs. Simultaneous Family Homes
- The wife argued that all four properties should be treated as matrimonial property because they had been used at different times as the family home.
- The judge rejected this “once a family home, always a family home” argument. Just because a house had been lived in for a period did not automatically make it a matrimonial asset.
The Husband’s Sole Ownership and Lack of “Mixing”
- The properties had always remained in the husband’s name.
- The wife had not contributed financially to the properties.
- Apart from one refurbishment (paid for with the husband’s business funds), there was no evidence of the couple treating the properties as jointly owned.
Needs vs. Sharing Principle
- The wife’s claim was assessed on her needs, not equal sharing.
- The court awarded her £657,000—enough to secure reasonable housing but far less than half of the total property portfolio’s value.

Key Features for Family Lawyers and their Clients

Just Because a House Has Been a Family Home Doesn’t Mean It Will Be Shared

The court is willing to depart from the equal sharing principle where assets clearly originated from one party.
Multiple homes used at different times do not automatically become matrimonial property.

Pre-Marital Assets Can Retain Their Character

If a party keeps an asset solely in their name and does not mix finances, courts are more likely to treat it as non-matrimonial.
This case reinforces Standish v Standish [2024] EWCA Civ 567, which held that even the family home can be unequally divided if there are strong pre-marital claims.

Needs-Based Outcomes Still Prevail in Long Marriages

Even when assets are non-matrimonial, courts will still ensure the financially weaker party can rehouse.
The wife here was awarded enough to buy a £650,000 property, but she did not get a share of all four houses.

If You Want to Protect Pre-Marital Property, Keep It Separate

Had the husband added the wife to the title, allowed her to financially contribute, or mingled finances, he might have lost his claim to keep the properties.
Clients who want to protect pre-marital wealth should consider pre-nuptial agreements or clear financial separation.

Final Thoughts: Four Homes, One Divorce, and a Lesson in Asset Protection

RM v WP highlights that just because multiple houses were lived in at different times, it does not mean they will all be divided equally. Pre-marital assets remain pre-marital unless there is strong evidence of mixing—and the courts will not hesitate to depart from a 50/50 split where fairness demands it.

For practitioners, the case serves as a useful precedent when advising clients who own multiple properties before marriage. For divorcing parties, the lesson is simple: if you want to claim a share of an asset, you need to show you treated it as joint property, not just that you lived in it.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: 4 houses, case law, matrimonialisation, rm v wp 2024, standish

11 February 2025

Married or Not? Lessons from Z v Z [2025] EWHC 276 (Fam) on Proving a Valid Marriage

What happens when one party claims they are married and the other flatly denies it? The recent case of Z v Z [2025] EWHC 276 (Fam) serves as a striking example of how the courts approach disputes over whether a legally valid marriage exists. With financial remedies at stake, the case underscores the importance of marriage registration, evidential burdens, and the challenges of proving—or disproving—a civil marriage.

The Case: A Marriage in Dispute

Ms. Z claimed that she and Mr. Z had a civil marriage on 14 December 2009 at X Registry Office. She produced a marriage certificate, bearing what appeared to be Mr. Z’s signature, and argued that this document should be conclusive proof of their legal union.

Mr. Z, however, denied that he had ever attended the ceremony, insisting that Ms. Z had tricked the registrar by using an imposter who fraudulently signed his name. He maintained that their only valid marriage was their Islamic Nikah in 1999, which was not recognised under English law.

Why did this dispute matter? Because without a legally recognised civil marriage, Ms. Z could not pursue a financial claim against Mr. Z.

What the Law Says: Proving a Valid Marriage

In England and Wales, a legally valid marriage requires:

Compliance with the formal requirements of the Marriage Act 1949, including proper notice and registration.
A properly conducted ceremony in an approved location, witnessed by two people.
Signatures on the marriage certificate, confirming the marriage took place.

The best evidence of a valid marriage is the official marriage certificate, as emphasised in L-K v K (No. 3) [2006] EWHC 3281 (Fam). This case confirmed that a marriage certificate is strong evidence but not conclusive—if fraud or error is alleged, the court must weigh all the evidence.

In Islam v Islam [2003] EWHC 1298 (Fam), the court found that a marriage certificate alone was not enough when compelling evidence suggested a fraudulent registration.

The Court’s Decision: Did the Marriage Happen?

After hearing extensive evidence, Mr Justice Trowell ruled in favour of Ms. Z, finding that the civil marriage did take place. The court based its decision on:

The Marriage Certificate: The judge found no expert evidence to support Mr. Z’s claim that the signature was forged.
Registrar’s Safeguards: The judge noted that registrars verify identity using photo ID before marriage ceremonies, making it highly unlikely that an imposter could have fooled officials.
Lack of Strong Counter-Evidence: While Mr. Z argued that there were no wedding photos, receipts, or family witnesses, the judge accepted Ms. Z’s explanation that civil marriages were not culturally significant and may not have been celebrated.
Mr. Z’s Credibility Issues: The judge highlighted inconsistencies in Mr. Z’s evidence, including a false Islamic divorce document he had created in 2013, and a conviction for perverting the course of justice in 1994.

However, the judge acknowledged "odd features" in Ms. Z’s evidence, including her inability to locate the ceremony’s witnesses and her failure to mention the civil marriage in earlier family proceedings.

Key Takeaways: Proving (or Disproving) a Marriage

A Marriage Certificate Is Strong Evidence, But Not Infallible
- Courts presume a marriage is valid if a certificate exists, but it can be challenged with compelling evidence.
Fraud Allegations Carry a High Burden of Proof
- The party alleging fraud (here, Mr. Z) must provide strong evidence—mere suspicion is not enough.
- Expert handwriting analysis could have helped, but Mr. Z failed to obtain one.
Cultural Norms Matter
- The court recognised that civil marriages are sometimes viewed as administrative formalities rather than major events, explaining the lack of wedding celebrations or family involvement.
Judicial Scepticism Toward Late Claims
- The judge noted that Ms. Z only pursued the divorce after years of litigation, raising some doubts.
- However, he accepted that her focus had been on child arrangements and protection from domestic abuse.
Delays Can Impact Available Evidence
- Key records, such as Mr. Z’s employment records, had been destroyed, making it harder for him to disprove attendance at the ceremony.

Final Thoughts: A Cautionary Tale

For family lawyers, Z v Z is a reminder that marriage disputes are not always clear-cut. While a marriage certificate is powerful evidence, it is not absolute—but challenging it requires real proof, not just denial.

For couples, the case highlights the importance of proper legal formalities and the risks of informal marriages that lack legal recognition. If you’re entering a religious marriage, consider ensuring it is legally registered, or you could face serious consequences in the event of a breakup.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, valid marriage, void, z v z

7 February 2025

When One Party Won’t Cooperate: Lessons from WZ v HZ [2024] EWFC 407 (B)

Few things are as frustrating in family law as a party who simply refuses to comply with court orders—particularly when it involves selling the former matrimonial home (FMH). The case of WZ v HZ [2024] EWFC 407 (B) is a prime example of the legal mechanisms available when one spouse obstructs a court-ordered sale.

This case is also notable for the court’s use of the Thwaite jurisdiction, which allows variations to existing financial remedy orders when circumstances change or a party frustrates their implementation. Below, we explore the key lessons from this case and practical takeaways for family law practitioners.

The Facts: A Sale Stalled by One Party

WZ (the wife) and HZ (the husband) had been locked in financial remedy litigation for years. A final order had been made in 2021, which required the sale of the former matrimonial home to provide the wife with funds to meet her housing needs. The order anticipated that the FMH would be on the market within three months and sold within six months.

However, three years later, the house remained unsold, and the wife continued living there rent-free while the husband paid the mortgage and maintenance. The husband accused the wife of deliberately frustrating the sale by refusing access to estate agents, rejecting reasonable offers, and even removing the ‘For Sale’ sign.

Faced with ongoing delays, mounting legal costs, and financial pressure, the husband returned to court seeking:

An order for possession of the FMH, allowing him to take control of the sale.
A Thwaite variation, arguing that the delay had resulted in a financial windfall for the wife, and the court should adjust the division of proceeds.

The Court’s Approach

Ordering Possession: A Rare but Necessary Step

The court acknowledged that it had tried everything to enforce the sale. Previous orders had given the husband sole conduct of the sale, but the wife’s obstruction had rendered this ineffective.

Citing Derhalli v Derhalli [2021] EWCA Civ 112, the judge confirmed that the court has the power to grant possession under FPR 9.24, which allows the court to enforce orders under Section 24A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. This power enables the court to remove an obstructive party from the home to ensure compliance with a sale order.

🔹 Lesson for practitioners: If a party repeatedly frustrates a sale, a possession order may be the only viable enforcement tool. This case shows that the courts are willing to take robust action when necessary.

Thwaite Jurisdiction: Adjusting Orders to Reflect Reality

The Thwaite jurisdiction, derived from Thwaite v Thwaite [1981] 2 FLR 280, allows courts to vary the terms of an executory order (one that has not yet been implemented) to achieve fairness.

In this case, the court found that:

The wife had benefited unfairly from delaying the sale, as property prices had risen significantly.
The original order assumed a sale in 2021, meaning the husband was now paying much more than intended.
The original division of proceeds was no longer fair, given the wife’s obstruction.

The court ruled that the increase in the sale price should not benefit the wife entirely. Instead, a portion of the additional equity would go toward covering the husband’s legal fees and outstanding maintenance obligations.

🔹 Lesson for practitioners: The Thwaite jurisdiction is a powerful tool in financial remedy cases where one party frustrates implementation. It ensures that delays do not unfairly enrich the obstructive party.

Key Takeaways for Family Lawyers

Enforcing Sales: Courts Will Step In

If a party refuses to cooperate, courts can grant possession orders to remove them from the property.
Even where a party is living in the FMH, they cannot indefinitely obstruct a sale.

Thwaite Variations: A Safety Net for Changing Circumstances

Orders that remain executory can be adjusted if circumstances change.
Deliberate obstruction can result in a financial penalty, ensuring the obstructive party does not benefit from their own misconduct.

Acting Early to Avoid Costly Litigation

This case took three years to return to court, during which time both parties incurred significant legal costs.
Had the husband applied earlier for enforcement measures, he may have avoided much of the financial and emotional toll.

Final Thoughts: The Cost of Non-Compliance

WZ v HZ [2024] highlights the perils of failing to comply with financial remedy orders. For parties tempted to frustrate court-ordered sales, the judgment sends a clear warning: the court has the power to act, and it will.

For practitioners, this case reinforces the importance of early intervention. If one party is blocking a sale, don’t wait—seek enforcement, possession orders, or Thwaite adjustments before delays spiral into costly litigation.

Published by James Thornton in Blog

Tags: case law, enforcement, fmh, sale of property, thwaite, thwaite jurisdiction

Older Posts ›

Mental Health and Financial Settlements in Family Law: TA v SB [2025] EWFC 61

Non-Disclosure and No-Show: How Courts Respond in Financial Remedy Cases – Mahtani v Mahtani [2025] EWFC 35 (Fam)

DF v YB [2025] EWFC 46 (B): A £1.3 Million Litigation Bill and Lessons on Efficiency, Conduct, and Transparency

Costs, Anonymity, and Open Justice in Family Law: Lessons from Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 26

From Bitcoin to Football Clubs: The High-Stakes Divorce of Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 1

Maintenance Pending Suit: The Art of Holding the Financial Ring – Lessons from SM v BA [2025] EWFC 28

Four Houses and a Divorce: The Complexities of Property and Contribution in RM v WP [2024] EWFC 191 (B)

Married or Not? Lessons from Z v Z [2025] EWHC 276 (Fam) on Proving a Valid Marriage

When One Party Won’t Cooperate: Lessons from WZ v HZ [2024] EWFC 407 (B)

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